8-1952

A Study Of Government And Labor Relations In The Atomic Energy Industry

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A STUDY OF GOVERNMENT AND LABOR RELATIONS IN THE ATOMIC ENERGY INDUSTRY

BISHOP

1952

A STUDY OF THE GOVERNMENT AND LABOR RELATIONS IN THE ATOMIC ENERGY INDUSTRY

By

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A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Science
In The
Graduate Division
of
Prairie View Agricultural and Mechanical College
Prairie View, Texas

August, 1952

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PREFACE

The author is of the opinion that the atomic energy industry will continue to have increasing effect upon our total economy. This study is an attempt to show in a modified legal way the relationship of the Government, industry and workers in labor relations in the atomic energy industry. Undertaking a study of the atomic energy industry and labor relations has called for employment of distinctively classified data. Even with this handicap, the materials have been adequate, and have shown trends which point toward an industry of magnanimous scope for our American civilization.

The successful completion of a problem involving the study of the United States and labor relations in this industry necessitated certain professional materials not found in the usual run of news or literature. Providing such materials were the Atomic Energy Commission, of which Mr. Gordon Dean is Chairman, and the Atomic Energy Labor Relations Panel. Mr. Aaron Horvitz, New York arbiter and attorney has served ably on the Panel, and his office was the source to very vital information relative to cases handled by the Panel. Mr. Donald B. Straus, secretary to the Panel, has written a report published in July 1950, which proved helpful in clarifying certain phases.

Perhaps, the most direct advisement and appreciation go to Dr. Jonnel Leonard Brown, Head, Department of Eco-

nomics, Prairie View A and M College. His encouragement for the maximum development of this importatant field in its legal, industrial, and societal aspects, elicited untold adaptation to the study. Kindred appreciation must go to Dr. E. G. High, Department of Chemistry, Prairie View A and M College. As an advisor on the technical phases of atomic energy, he checked the manuscript for their accuracy, and extended interest to the whole problem.

Finally, to the Division of Graduate Study and Dr. J. M. Drew, for permission to pursue such a new and embracing subject, and the additional members of the examing committee, Mr. J. C. Rawls, and Mr. B. A. Mayberry, goes the deepest acknowledgement.

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INTRODUCTION

Successful management and hence production require as a cornerstone a sound and constructive labor relations policy in the light of the nature of the industry. Labor relations capable of being boasted on by either workers or industry have not always been in evidence. It is well known that, "Early unions did not engage in collective bargaining as we know it today. Customarily, the union....announced the wages and working conditions for which its members would work. If the employer refused to agree, a strike would ensue, and perhaps a compromise would be worked out. Only slowly did the custom develop of joint employer-employee conferences at which bargaining occurred prior to direct union action."[1]

Subsequently, the fight of the AF of L under the leadership of Samuel Gompers, was successful in curbing "government by injunction." Later the C I O emerged as a co-partner in developing strong trade unions. The growth of trade unions has without a doubt made sound labor relations a prime requisite of sound industrial management. Often times the failure of business enterprises to conform to the American democratic

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1. Gordon F. Bloom, and Herbert R. Northrup, Economics of Labor Relations, (Philadelphia, The Blakiston Company) 1950, pp. 22-23

philosophy in the changing times, has often caused laborers to resort to securing adjustments through collective bargaining or legislation.

The first law affording labor a semblance of the present day philosophy in labor relations was the Norris La Guardia Anti-Injunction Act. Following closely on its heels was the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act. These laws and the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, from a historical point of view owe their origin to several factors over a long period of time. They were the rise of big business in the United States, the increased difficulty in handling labor relations along the older lines of approach, and the development of scientific and engineering research, and lastly, the rise of trade unions as a result of this legislation.

Prior to the advent of the Atomic Energy Program, labor legislation which covered those industries affected by the interstate commerce normally came under the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act of 1947. However, the Atomic Bomb development was entirely new in big business, and since it was to meet the exigencies of war there was no attempt made to utilize the NLR Act until after the cessation of hostilities.

The Problem

The problem of this study is to show the relationship of the government, industry, and workers, in labor relations in the atomic energy industry in war and peace.

Definitions

Certain general terms which should be defined are atomic energy, labor relations, government, workers, and employees; management and employer, business and American industry.

Atomic energy is defined as the energy produced from atoms. Labor relations are those existing as a result of contractual relations between government, industry, and workers. Government is the United States of America as provided in the Constitution. Workers and employees are used as synonymous terms. Management, business, employer, and American industry are used synonymously also.

Limitations

The study is limited to a discussion of the effect of labor relations in the atomic energy industry between the government, industry, and workers. No attempt will be made to discuss the equally alive subject of international control or the purely technical aspects of the problem.

Methodology

The problem's solution will hinge on a study of the atomic energy program in its initial phases, as a background for the type of labor relations which have developed since its introduction into the American economy. From this approach, an investigation of the factors surrounding Federal legislation, mediation, and arbitration will determine the relationship of the Government, industry, and unions, and the extent of the United States control of

labor relations.

Materials and information used in the solution of the problem have been obtained from the United States Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D. C.; U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, Labor Relations Panel, New York 22, New York; Professor H. F. Taggart, Assistant Dean, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, and the W. R. Banks Library, Prairie View Agricultural and Mechanical College.

Every attempt has been made to give due emphasis to those phases of the report which lend the proper background for solution of the problem.

Chapter I

THE DEVELOPMENT AND INITIAL ASPECTS OF THE GOVERNMENT AND LABOR RELATIONS IN THE ATOMIC ENERGY INDUSTRY

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Military Development Prior to World War II

During 1939 and 1940, atomic energy made inroads into the economy of the world, and the United States was taken aback like all other countries. "Many public statements, some of them by responsible scientists, called attention to the enormous energy available in uranium for explosives and for controlled power, so that U-235 became a familiar by-word indicating great things to come."[2] Albert Einstein, sent a letter to President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and advised him of the practicability of manufacturing the atomic bomb. President Roosevelt with his advisers took it under consideration.

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2. Henry DeWolf Smyth, Atomic Energy for Military Purposes (Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1945) p. 31.

Since its interest was for military use initially, concentration was placed on the problem of restricting scientific publications relating to the allied areas. The President appointed a committee, known as the "Advisory Committee on Uranium."[3] It consisted of L. J. Gribbs (director of the Bureau of Standards) as chairman, and Commander G. C. Hoover of the Navy Bureau of Ordnance. In April 1940, an official clamp was placed on the publication of all articles and papers pertaining to atomic energy of military interest. This served not only to guard the pertinent data on this new development, but to channel articles of value not previously regarded so.

The Uranium Committee set the stage for the portentous program in its report dated November 1, 1939, and transmitted to President Roosevelt by Briggs, Adamson, and Hoover. "It specifically mentions both atomic power and an atomic bomb as possibilities. It specifically recommended procurement of 4 tons of graphite and 50 tons of uranium oxide for measurements of absorption cross section of carbon."[4] The first expenditure was a "transfer of funds ($6000) from the Army and the Navy to purchase materials in accordance with the recommendation of November 1, is reported in a memorandum from Briggs to General E. M. Watson (President Roosevelt's aide),

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3. Smyth, Op. Cit., p. 47
4. Ibid., p. 47.

on February 20, 1950."[5]

In June 1940, the organization of the National Defense Research Committee (NDRC) was instructed by President Roosevelt, with Dr. Vannevar Bush as chairman. Instead of dissolution the Uranium Committee was reconstituted as a subcommittee of the NDRC. The Uranium Committee studied more seriously the need for funds to support research. As a result the first contract was awarded to Columbia University, where Dr. Enrico Fermi, Italian physicist and Nobel Prize winner was visiting as a scientist.

The project was approved by the NDRC along two lines;

(a) "further measurements of the nuclear constants involved in the proposed type of reaction,

(b) experiments with amounts of uranium and carbon equal to about one fifth to one quarter of the amount that could be estimated as the minimum in which a chain reaction would sustain itself."[6]

The first NDRC contract (NDC-rc-32) was signed November 8, 1940, being effective from November 1, 1940, to November 1, 1941. The amount of this contract was $40,000."[7] Many other contracts were awarded, and by 1941 the total projects approved were sixteen, totalling about $300,000.

Even a few days before Pearl Harbor, the impending threat of war caused Dr. Bush and his associates to push the

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5. Smyth, Op. Cit., pp. 47-48.
6. Ibid., p. 49.
7. Ibid., p. 50.

uranium project vigorously, NDRC was transferred to the office of Scientific Research and Development. Dr. Bush was its director and assisting him were Drs. James B. Conant, H. D. Smyth, H. C. Urey, E. D. Lawrence, A. H. Compton, G. B. Pegram, L. T. Briggs, S. K. Allison, J. W. Beans, G. Breit, E. V. Condon, R. Gunn, and H. T. Wensel. The OSRC arranged two ways for the recommendation of contracts. First, "contracts for the scientific parts of the work would be recommended to Dr. Bush not by the full S-1 section but by Briggs and Conant after conferences with their program chiefs."[8] Second, "contracts for the development of diffusion and centrifuge separation processes were to be recommended by the Planning Board, which would be responsible for the heavy-water production program also."[9]

These contracts were to aid in developing the five production methods. Namely, the centrifuge, diffusion, and electromagnetic methods of separating U-235; the uranium-graphite pile and the uranium-heavy-water pile methods of producing plutonium. To push the methods to the production stage it felt that a commitment of five hundred million dollars would be needed to develop sites like Los Alamos, N. M., under the direction of Monsanto Chemical Co., with Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer as the director of its physics laboratories, deemed the finest in the world.

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8. Smyth, op. cit., p. 76.

9. Ibid., p. 77.

It was also necessary to form a new district in the Army Corps of Engineers. On June 18, 1942, Colonel J. C. Marshall, was given the assignment. "This district was designed as the Manhattan District. Upon its establishment it became known as the "DSM Project" (Development of Substitute Materials), 'for security reasons'". On September 17, 1942, the Secretary of War placed General L. R. Groves of the Army Corps of Engineers in complete charge of all Army activities relating to the DSM Project."[10]

Finally, in this respect, it could be asserted that production was definitely under way. As a result the President caused to be appointed a Military Policy Committee whose duties were:

1. To plan military policies relating to materials and research,
2. To plan military policies relating to development production, strategy, and tactics,
3. To submit progress reports to the policy group designated by the President.

In the summer of 1942, the procurement, employment, labor relations, and engineering functions of the Planning Board were taken over by MED. When in the spring of 1943 MED took over the research and development contracts from OSRD, this ended the latter's formal connection with the uranium project.

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10. Smyth., op. cit., p. 83.

Industrial Responsibility

The development of the Substitute Materials (DSM) Project was placed under Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation. Various component parts of the work were too far separated physically and were too complicated technically to be handled by a single company-especially in view of the rapid pace required. A decision was made to relieve Stone and Webster of that portion of the work dealing with the construction of plutonium production facilities. General Grooves designated E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company to develop this phase of the work, since he felt it was best organized for it.

Arrangements with du Pont, which is illustrative of the dealings with other industrial firms, are unique in the field of contractual relations.

> "The du Pont Company, in accepting the undertaking, insisted that the work be conducted without profit and without patent rights accruing to them. The du Pont Company did request, however, that in view of the unpredictable hazards involved, the Government provide maximum protection against losses sustained by du Pont.11

Due to the difficulty to predict the cost of work, it was necessary to arrange a cost-plus-a-fixed fee contract between the Government and du Pont. The fee was set at $1.00. A very cheap sum indeed, but further, "the Government agreed to pay all costs of the work by direct reimbursement or through

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11. Smyth., op. cit., p. 110.

allowances provided by the contract to cover....expenses.... in accordance with normal du Pont accounting practices as determined by audit by certified public accounts."[12]

Specific responsibilities of du Pont were in the field of engineering, designing, and construction of small scale semi-works at the Clinton Engineer Works in Tennessee and the engineering, designing, construction and operation of plutonium production at the Hanford Engineer Works in Washington. Finally, du Pont was known for its adaptability to engineering and industrial problems but it needed the experience of nuclear physics and radiochemistry. For this it depended on the Metallurgical Laboratory of the University of Chicago, later under Dr. H. C. Urey. Here also training of personnel was effected, but the majority were provided with the necessary background at the Clinton Works. In the main, this training was highly technical and of a special type, hence employees of this type were in the thousands at first.

Stirring the human imagination and spurring investigative undertakings to the maximum was the mining of uranium. Since uranium is the fundamental ingredient of the atom bomb and the basic fuel of atomic energy, military and nonmilitary, unprecedented attention was given the mineral. The United States' only significant concentration of uranium to date is

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12. Smyth, op. cit., p. 111.

located in the 50,000 square mile area known as the Colorado Plateau. The area shaped as a ham-shaped blob covers roughly four states, Utah, Colorado, Arizona, and New Mexico.

It has been felt by many that "the deposits are of a low grade, and the uranium-bearing rock of little continuity. Geiger counters usually determine the relative quality by radioactive clicks. Yet, the ore assay minimum is set by the Atomic Energy Commission at 0.10 per cent (1/10 of one per cent) uranium oxide (U_3O_8). The AEC, which regulates the prices for all uranium ore....figures that 0.20 percent (2/10 of one percent) uranium oxide is average for the Colorado Plateau."[13] The minimum price ranges from about $1 to $3.50 per pound of uranium oxide ore, depending upon the grade.

Five private processing plants were eventually put in operation. "United States Vanadium Company has mills at Bifle and Uravan, Colorado, while Vanadium Corporation of America has them at Naturita and Durango, Colorado, and Hite, Utah. The Climax Molybdenum Company recently entered the processing field and (constructed) a new mill at Grand Junction. In addition, the AEC has a Government-owned plant at Monticello, Utah, which is operated by the Galiger Company of Salt Lake City. The American Smelting and Refining Company acts as buying agent for the AEC at Monticello and also at Marysvale,

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13. U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, Uranium, Courtesy of The Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company (Publishers of Big Magazine, March 1951).

Utah."[14]

Additional sources are made available from Canada and South Africa. At Capetown, South Africa, "one of the Unions gold mines in Johannesburgh....'would start to' produce uranium as a by-product....'next month' under a program jointly sponsored by the United States and Britain," so reported J.H. Vijoen, Minister of Mines. Another mineral, thorium is felt to be a potential source of atomic energy has been discovered also, in the same region.[15]

The total cost of atomic energy and the production of the bombs that brought a cessation to hostilities in World War II with Japan was approximately $2,000,000,000. A decided effect and change took place in the American industrial economy. A change that was dynamic and was to have a far greater impact in the post war economy.

Production After World War II

The real effect of the Atomic Energy Program was to have its most profound developments after World War II. Three major plants or projects were in operation at the beginning of 1946. They were the Clinton Works in Tennessee consisting of two/and the Hanford Works in Washington. Technically, each had its individualism, but when contributing to the production of the atomic

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14. U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, op. cit.

15. New York Times, (April 2, 1952) p. 5.

bomb and energy represented a collective effort for success in this phase of the economy.

To successfully view the reason the United States Government has taken this unaccustomed path of monopoly in the development of atomic energy, there must be a realization of the purposes of its production. Originally, it was for war, but now it assumes an equally important role in peace also. What if our stock piles become adequate? Even a modest number compared to the number of artillery shells of any caliber, will be enough to turn the entire civilization into a wailing, moaning, and disastrous heap. "The Congress, deciding upon the form and shape of development, faced the fact that energy-yielding fissionable materials may be used as fuels for power-producing machines....nuclear reactors.. ..or as explosives in atomic bombs."[16]

As of May 1952, at least seventeen tests had been carried out of one kind or another in the United States. Bombs used were reduced in size considerably, compared with the initial postwar tests at Bikini in the Pacific. The fourteenth test or explosion recorded on this continent according to a report in the New York Times was at the AEC Nevada Proving

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16. Morse Salisbury, University of Michigan, U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, Director of Information Services. Remarks at the Medical School Convocation, (September 30, 1950) "The Atomic Energy Program of the American People." pp. 1-2.

Grounds, 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas. This documentation revealed that "The purpose of the Program will be the same as its predecessors; to obtain data on the behavior and effects of nuclear devices....they will not involve actual weapons."[17]

In 1946, the Atomic Energy Act was enacted by Congress, and provided for a commission of six members. In Congress, there is a Joint Atomic Energy Committee, consisting of 18 members of which Senator Brien McMahon of Connecticut is chairman.[18]

The Atomic Energy Commission, composed of capable men who are representatives of the American people, acts as the trustee and the manager of this project for them. It carries on eight major jobs:

1. Locating and buying the ores that are the basis of the industry.
2. Making fissionable materials from these ores.
3. Making and storing atomic weapons.
4. Developing more effective atomic weapons.
5. Arranging for research on the fundamental facts of atomic energy development of its beneficial uses.
6. Manufacturing and selling radioactive isotopes.
7. Distributing unclassified information about atomic energy to the general and the technical public and classified information to those authorized to receive secret data.

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17. New York Times, Tuesday, (April 1, 1952) p. 7.
18. See Appendixes.

8. Maintaining prescribed security over the atomic energy projects including its plants and its findings.

To view any of the contemplated effects upon our industrial economy, of atomic energy, there must first be a determination of the forceful elements of the atomic bomb's manufacture. Whereas, its use initially was strictly military, yet, it bore heavily on the economy. The production brought about the use of a vast amount of materials and utilization of a large segment of the labor market. These are the two main areas of interest to those who have foretold a change in our economy. However, it is the latter that commands the attention of the problem under attack, yet the former must be weighed along with it because of their interrelatedness. To bear out the weight of these contentions may be an emphasis on the social significance which has been cogently expressed in these terms:

> "adjustment and conversion to atomic plants might be deterred by restrictions intended to prevent destructive applications. Unlike radio, which was most compatible with existing environment, atomic power will necessitate a reorganization of our economy. The effect of such a fundamental change on existing sources of energy is not likely to be great in the initial period of perhaps a decade or more."19

First though, there must be the complete realization that the atomic bomb is an awful weapon, and the application of the first atomic energy harnessed for military purposes

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19. Marshall Edward Dimock, Business and Government, New York, Henry Holt Company, 1949, p. 626.

differs only in degrees, however, from similar applications of fire by man for the past several thousand years. To illustrate there must be brought in the biological and medical scientists, who are concerned with life, for they have to consider it in terms of ionizing radiation produced. They do not think seriously of the number of calories of heat produced, and then utilized in various means of transportation and industries. It is hardly likely that from the standpoint of their profession that they will think of the effects of the explosive force in times of war, except perhaps as concern must be manifested in event of war.

So it has remained largely with the economists, who are more purely the social scientists, to project thinking, as to the turns the economy will make. Their concern is continuous, and rests in several areas and among them are the economic problems of industry and of necessity - labor. These problems are important in their own right, as they are concerned with the construction of the plant facilities, and the manufacture and the process of the energy, and its care, storage and utilization, with the corresponding note of the serious aspects of depletion of natural resources as an instance.

Gordon Dean, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, in 1951 stated, "as of today the role of atomic energy in this nation's economy is more negative than positive. That is to say, our atomic energy program is taking more out of the

wealth and resources of our country than it is putting in."[20] This fact may be further illustrated by a contract entered in by the Atomic Energy Commission, with a new company called "Electric, Inc." to supply power for the needs of the Commission's new separation plant in Paducah, Kentucky. The arrival of the moment when this, some other, or as one of the Commission's subsidiaries can supply power from atomic energy will be most gratifying. Perhaps, the present day economists can even envision a name like "Atomic Energy, Inc." The fact remains that while the world ultimately looks to the atom to produce power, the atomic energy program is today the largest single consumer of power. This is not a pleasant fact but it is a fact."[21]

One year later, AEC had announced....proposals for privately financed construction and operation of (atomic) reactors for the production of fissionable materials and power."[22] Electrical power from atomic energy on an experimental basis has already been generated at its reactor station near Idaho Falls, Idaho.

"But Gordon Dean, Commission chairman, has said it will be five to ten years before atomic energy can compete eco-

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20. Gordon Dean, The Role of Atomic Energy in the World Economy, U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, Speech, Northwestern U. Centennial Celebration, (February 28, 1951).
21. Ibid., Speech.
22. Ibid., Speech.

nomically with coal, oil, and water power."[23]

A look at the portentous atomic energy program in 1952, shows evidence of a gradual reduction in the unit costs for both plutonium and uranium-235 with a corresponding increase output/of fissionable materials. Certain portions of the work could not be made public, but information for public-record reveals information concerning work in three sections of the country. These are South Carolina, Kentucky, and the Ohio River Valley, where construction of a feed material plant was begun and a new $1 billion plant to produce, uranium 235. "The (latter) plant would employ the "gaseous diffusion" process for separating fissionable uranium as it occurs in nature. Then the gaseous diffusion process (was) the only one being used in the United States."[24] AEC planned to hire 4,500 employees to run the plant.

respectively, the two former projects are known as the Paducah Site and the Savannah River Plant. An article in the Houston Post decribed it as having a payroll of $1.7 million a week. Again the AEC selected the firm of E. I. du Pont Nemours and Company, to construct and operate the project. The hiring began at the rate of 1200 a week thus posing a problem for short-run labor factors in supply.[25]

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23. New York Times, Sunday, (April 6, 1952) p. 13.

24. The Houston Post, Tuesday, (March 11, 1952)

25. The Houston Post, Tuesday (March 18, 1952)

Various situations have presented themselves in the development of these sites. Among them are housing and the labor force. In the Paducah area an additional 4900 employees alone will have to migrate. This will include the total 12,000 workers for peak employment. Aid was provided these in-migrants before they moved into the area. Most of it was the result of a survey of the available labor market before the project had gotten under way.

Of necessity there had to be steps taken to alleviate the housing conditions. In doing this the Housing and Home agency acted with the board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System[26] to modify credit restrictions under Regulation X for 1000 housing units for the Paducah and 1150 for the Savannah area. Since these programs were to begin about the same time, representatives undertook studies for planning for permanent personnel also. This agency sought and was successful in having approved a system of "interest-free" loans for planning additions to Paducah, Kentucky, and Barnwell, S. C., hospitals, and North Augusta, S. C., schools, and water supplies at Siken, S. C. Cooperating in these ventures was the South Carolina legislature."[27] Such was necessary to relieve

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26. Raymond P. Kent, Money and Banking, (New York, Rinehart and Company, Inc., 1951) p. 458.

27. United States Atomic Energy Commission, Major Activities in the Atomic Energy Programs, (Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D. C., July 1951) p. 18.

Table I[28]

CURRENT STATUS OF HOUSING, SAVANNAH RIVER AREA

Forecast June 1952

Total estimated employees	36,000
Estimated local hires	12,700
Estimated in-migrants	23,300
Estimated in-migrant families	13,980
Estimated in migrants single	3,220
Estimated families in self owned trailers	8,000
Estimated single employees requiring housing	6,320

28. Congressional Record, Senate, April 10, 1952, p. 4015.

the increasing problems in the state for a new economic order, never before envisioned.

A Congressional report by Senator Brien McMahon of Connecticut, Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy directs attention to the estimations for solutions to diverse problems. Senator McMahon stated, "The assumption reflects AEC experience (recently acquired and weighed) at Hanford and Oak Ridge and also the number of trailer spaces constructed or planned for this area."[29]

Maximum estimates of the entire states of Georgia and South Carolina construction labor supply were prepared by the Bureau of Employment Security and were tentative in nature. As of June 1951, employment by AEC and its contractors increased from 73,000, in December 1950 to 100,000. By June 1952, this figure was soaring at approximately the 200,000 mark. These workers represent an additive element of far-reaching effect in the economy. Their scale of pay measures well with any similar work in other regions of the nation.

Since they represent almost 2% of the 15,000,000 union members in America, it can be expected that labor relations and policies affecting them will be viewed critically. Not only because of the type of production they are now engaged in, but in view of the contemplated impact of atomic energy on the industrial economy in the world and in the United States.

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29. Congressional Record, Senate, April, 1952, p. 4015.

Business Participation

Business participation may be indirectly divided into three sections in the atomic energy program. Those of small business, larger business, and educational institutions. Smaller businesses were considered mainly as those independent enterprises which employed less than 500 employees. Also most of the contracts of these firms received contracts amounting to less than $500,000. Limitations, including also various materials, influenced the concern and intervention of the AEC and the United States Congress.

Generally, there were two distinct areas of development (1) tool shortages and (2) critical labor areas. In an attempt to cope with this situation, "On March 18, 1952, Clay Bedford, special assistant to the Secretary of Defense, declared that though machine tool shortages existed in critical areas, in his opinion the industry was making efforts to supply defense requirements as soon as possible."[30] During the same period, Congressional interest was manifested in a report that, "the Mobilization and Procurement Subcommittee of the Senate Select Committee on Small Business continued hearings on shortages of

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30. Weekly Report, (Congressional Quarterly News Features, Washington, D. C., Vol. X, No. 12, March 21, 1952) p. 264.

machine tools, procurement, and distress labor areas."[31]

Commenting in the Houston Post in January 1952, ex-President Hoover stressed the fact that the nation was actually in a war economy except for the shooting on a world wide scale. It is true that at this time we were diverting more and more civilian production to materials. Moreover, a greater portion of our man power was being placed under arms. All this increased scarcity of civilian goods and decreased spending power. Implications were that economic strain was the result and called for employment of those tendencies which tend to alleviate the severity. Greater still was the continued progress and growth of the Defense program, keeping in mind that the ships of materials and labor, and the prices and wages must be kept on even keels.

Emphasizing the real problems in Defense Mobilization as well as atomic energy find them inextricably wound in bomb monopoly and research progress, the discoveries of the atomic bomb by Russia and Great Britain, and the contemplated development by others.

Small businesses have always been pressure points. Congressmen have formed committees to deal with their special problems. A meeting of the National Small Business Men's

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31. Weekly Report, op. cit., p. 264.

Association Convention in Washington April 1, 1952, pointed to the need for the removal of controls on materials. Cryptically, many materials are withheld from the smaller business category because of the limited available resources and the character of atomic energy work is unique and new. As a result the larger the firm, the greater the potential for handling the abrupt changes, modifications, or interruptions in either construction or production.

After the report by Clay Bedford, the special assistant to the Secretary of Defense, other agencies of the Government gave indication of study of the near crises. Nevertheless, the bone of contention on the part of small business firms was that they were being squeezed out of work. It thus became increasingly difficult for them to; received satisfactory profits or returns on capital, expand facilities, assume the healthy attitude in contractual considerations, so prominent in free enterprise, and reduced their opportunity to develop long term labor policies.

Moreover, of the two types of contracts, those of a prime class and subcontracts let by cost reimbursement contractors, the small businesses were awarded 28.5 per cent of the former and 41.2 per cent of the latter.[32] Awards in both classes of contracts amounted to $125,300,000, according to a 9 month study ending in March 31, 1951. This study was

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32. United States Atomic Energy Commission, Major Activities in the Atomic Energy Programs, (Washington, D. C., United States Printing Office, July 1951) p. 55.

reported by the AEC to the small business Committees of the Senate and the House in Congress. The table below summarizes this report:

Table II[34]

SUMMARY OF CONTRACTS BY AEC

	Under $500,000		Over $500,000	
Prime Contracts	Million Dollars	Percent of Total	Million Dollars	Percent of Total
Small Business	10.2	28.6	10.7	2.6
Larger Business	19.3	53.9	382.1	92.9
Educational institutions and other	6.3	17.5	18.4	4.5
	35.8	100.0	411.2	100.0
Subcontracts let by cost-reimbursement contractors				
Small Business	86.8	41.2	17.6	7.5
Larger Business	122.7	58.3	217.8	92.5
Educational institutions and other	1.1	0.5	---	---
	210.6	100.0	235.4	100.0

To have been smaller recipients in areas in which they were fully capable of performing from the start in such an important program means two things of a general nature to their

33. United States Atomic Energy Commission, Major Activities in the Atomic Energy Programs (Washington, D. C., United States Government Printing Office, July 1951) p. 55.

34. Ibid., p. 55.

welfare. First, the maintenance of the position and welfare of small independent enterprises in the atomic energy program and the acquisition of project experience for future, larger, or perhaps eventually independent work. Experience is an asset to all phases of the program. Lending itself, not so much in the tempo of proving the success of some research technique or data, but in the economical application of the expenditures. Providing in times of peace and preparation for war the worth of the free enterprise system in the American economy.

Definite philosophy in protection of this worth and character is very much in evidence more directly in the general provisions of Chapter I, AEC, Code of Federal Regulations, of the Atomic Energy Act. The purpose Section 3.1 provides, "Contracts entered into by the United States Atomic Energy Commission, and subcontracts entered into under such contracts, usually contain a "disputes article" providing that disputes arising under the contract or subcontract which are not disposed by mutual agreement shall be decided in the first instance by the representative of the Commission duly authorized to supervise and administer performance of the work under the contract....General Manager of Commission is....representative to decide all appeals arising under the "disputes articles".. ..an Advisory Board of Contract Appeals to assist the General Manager....recommending to the General Manager appropriate dis-

position."[35] Provisions, nevertheless, are set forth for an appeal from the decisions of the contracting officer (3.11), upon filing within 3 days of its receipt. The notice of appeal is promptly forwarded by the contracting officer to the Atomic Energy Commission Advisory Board of Contract Appeals, Washington, D. C. Such an appeal need only be the submission of a letter by the contractor (3.12). The contractor will be given at least a 15 day notice of the date of the hearings.

When such appeals reach the stage of notification of hearings, "The hearing will be considered de novo and independent findings of fact will be made (3.22)"[36] In furtherance of this consideration...."all testimony offered shall be invited to U. S. C. 1001 or 18 U. S. C. 1621, as appropriate."[37] Lastly, in the interest of steps deemed appropriate to assure the common defense and security; these rules designed for just and simple procedure to prevent unjustifiable expense and delay, may be modified or relaxed but continuation in this respect must be for the interest of justice and expeditious dispute settlement (3.40).

Evidence of the expansion and the need for experience then in all three sections of business participation may evince

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35. U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, Rules of Procedure of United States Atomic Energy Commission Advisory Board of Contract Appeals, Title 10, Chapter 1, Part 3 (Washington, D. C. F. R. Doc. 50-7476, August 29, 1950; Authority: Sections 3.1 to 3.40 issued under 60 Stat. 755.775; 42 U.S.C. 1801-1819)

36. Ibid., Chapter 1, Part 3.

37. Ibid., Chapter 1, Part 3.

from a report in the New York Times 1952 publication of the AEC's report of impending developments almost as revolutionary as the first "A" bomb. The report was a joint study by the Defense Department and the Atomic Energy Commission to effect the plea of President Truman for a third major atomic energy expansion program since World War II (the second was under way at this time). The essence follows;

"Although Senator McMahon deserves credit for supplying the spark that led to the President's announcement, the tender was nevertheless, about ready to ignite. He had proposed a 6 billion expansion program, and an atomic army, navy, and air force. Thus saving the nations billions of dollars in arms budget."[38] The program was proposed due to, "(1) the tense world situation; (2) the inability, because of Russian objections, to secure any reasonable system of international control of atomic development; (3) marked Russian progress in atomic development; (4) success of last year's (1951) Eniwetok and Nevada tests; (5) availability of much more of the basic raw material--uranium; and (6) prospects that with continued development much cheaper and more plentiful sources of new fissionable materials can be utilized."[39]

Such a vast program taxed even further the materials of the economy tremendously, and the AEC's report of 1952

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38. New York Times, (February 3, 1952) p. 68, sec. 4.

39. Ibid., p. 6E, sec. 4.

foresaw the arising man power difficulties too. On the whole, and with the successful completion of the program a noticeable reduction in cost could be realized. For instance, a bomb costing perhaps $500,000 to $5,000,000 is a good exchange any day for a ship costing from $15,000,000 to $100,000,000.

Business Participation by Institutions

Institutions, especially, educational ones, are termed peculiarly business in this discussion. For the most part their work is strictly research, but may be termed scientific and educational business. To carry out its research program the Commission maintains three national laboratories, the Brookhaven National Laboratory, in Chicago, and the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, as well as the University of California Radiation Laboratory, and the Los Alamos Laboratory and numerous smaller laboratories associated with its production sites. Also, must be included major research programs in approximately 20 other larger industrial and university laboratories.

At present there are more than 100 contracts in effect which give prospect of applying some time to the solution of problems affecting the atomic energy industry and the economy as a whole.

> "These cover work in the fields of chemistry, mathematics, metallurgy, physics, biology, and medicine ....research in the fields of biology and medicine alone at a level of about 20 million dollars per year....the Commission appreciates that radiation has an unique relation to cancer--it can cause cancer, diagnose cancer, and kill cancer. The Commission accordingly supports a rather large cancer pro-

gram which includes the free distribution of radioactive materials for cancer research and the support of cancer research projects, and the maintenance of clinical research facilities in its national laboratories."[40]

At Oak Ridge, the Medical Division of the Oak Ridge Institute operates a Cancer Research Hospital of a 30 bed size. It's purpose embraces a program to study the treatment of malignant diseases.with radioactive materials.

Equally important, will arise situations contributing to the sterility of workers and communities in and around atomic energy projects. Several years will be needed to adequately determine the extent of such possibility, but inherent in a problem of this kind are population irregularities. These might be evidenced in populace decline in island-like fashion or areas. Serious declines in population bear heavily on the economy as far as military strength, labor manpower, and general national wellbeing are concerned. A prolific, fertile, and healthy birth rate is to be aspired for in no uncertain terms. Attention has turned to prognostications in this respect. Outstanding, was one in 1952 by professor Frank W. Nostestein,[41] of the Department of Population Research, Princeton University. It turned notice on the increase of three age groups as they would rank in 1970 with respect to increase and decrease; age group 45-64, the largest increase in population; age group 65 and over next; and

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40. Paul C. Aebersold, Growth in Peacetime Uses of Atomic Energy, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, Isotopes Division, AEC, (Reprint: The inservice Training Course in Radiological Health, U. of Michigan, School of Public Health, February 5-8, 1951).

41. New York Times, (April 6, 1952) p. 7, sec. 3, Fig. 7

age group 20-44 the smallest increase. Implications are clear and did not take into account direct factors surrounding atomic energy programs.

The largest and perhaps most vigorous use of atomic energy, is that of isotopes. "More than 1000 departments of laboratories in over 500 institutions in the United States are using radioisotopes."[42] Oak Ridge National Laboratory totaled more than 18,000 shipments of radioisotopes to users in the United States and 1000 to foreign countries, including the period covered by May 1951. Sale of these radioactive materials began in 1946.

> "Neither radioactivity nor radioactive isotopes are new; they have been in rather common use for over a quarter of a century. What is new is their greatly increased availability and utilization. Prior to the advent of the nuclear reactor....a dozen radioactive isotopes or radioactive forms of elements were in "common usage". These were the cyclotron-produced radioisotopes which, like the naturally occurring radioisotopes of radium and radon were available in only limited quantities. The current distribution program is a direct outgrowth of proposal made...'scientists' ....U. S. Army, the original operators of the atomic energy project."[43]

The principal uses of radioisotopes are for tracing atoms and for sources of ionizing radiation. Such a technical use means "radioactive atoms" or radioisotopes can be used to label other atoms and molecules for the purpose of following them through complex processes. In many instances

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42. U. S. AEC, op. cit., p. 33-34.

43. Aebersold, op. cit., (Reprint)

they are beginning to have wide applications similar to those which have employed radium for many years. One common example is that of radioactive cobalt for radiographic testing.

Medicine has has utilized radioisotopes as tools of diagnosis and in research. Without the isotope tracer technique it would be difficult if not impossible to appreciate the great speed and dynamics of most metabolic processes as well as to elucidate the complicated pathways.

Industrial uses of isotopes, according to Aebersold, as in the case of medicine, are of two types; (1) where the radiomaterial is used as a source of radiation, and (2) where it is used as a tracer.

One far advanced in applications is that of radioactive thichness gages. A single type is based on a measurement of transmitted radiation, and another is based on measurement of reflective radiation. Workers may well plan to accept as practical and usable this type of gage, and it may affect private industry directly.

> "The advantage of the radioactive thickness gage over other thickness gages is that no contact is made with the material being measured. Also, it canebe adapted to give a continuous recording of the thickness and does not require stopping or sampling the material as in the case in most mechanical gages. The other type of thickness gage is a more recent development and,....the thickness of the sheet material in this case is determined by measuring the amount of radiation reflected from it rather than transmitted through it..... is particularly useful in measuring the thick-

> ness of coating materials where it is desired to measure the thickness placed on a base material. ...access to side of the sheet material is necessary. A striking example of the second type of industrial application, that is, where the radioisotope is used as a tracer atom, is the study of wear and friction."44

Study, referred to in the second type, is gradually realizing the perfection of methods, that permit easy determination of the relative merits of various lubricating oils without altering the assembly of the motor. This process is most useful in modern automobile construction.

Radioisotope tracers have been advantageously and successfully employed in plant life processes, the basic sciences, and agriculture. Much of the progress has been the result of the cooperation of the U. S. Department of Agriculture and the AEC, cryptically, a high note is struck when the food condition is considered for the world as a whole. F. W. Taussig took a lot of pains to point out that workers produce more when they are fed.well. There yet exists areas in the U. S. lacking full utilization and still others in the world are in dire need of correct applications of land for agricultural use.

America today has the first claim on the total number of acres of land cultivated per person in the world, yet strikingly, the original calories per acre are smaller than four other nations. According to Zimmerman, "Food production in any country depends on the supply of land and machine pow-

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44. Aebersold, op. cit., (Reprint)

er or a highly intensive form of agriculture, i.e., intensive both in capital (fertilizer, machine power, science) and in labor. Which method is chosen depends on the basic conditions of the country, especially the population density, more particularly the density per acre of arable land."[45]

On the basis of these criteria used the rank of various regions in food production per capita of production is noted:

Table III[46]

Food Production per Capita of Population[1]

	Acres Cultivated per person	Original Calories per acre	Original Calories per person
Rank			
1.	North America	Western Europe	North America
2.	U. S. S. R.	Eastern Asia	South America
3.	South America	South America	Western America
4.	South Asia	South Asia	U. S. S. R.
5.	Western Europe	North America	South Asia
6.	Eastern Asia	U. S. S. R.	Eastern Asia

[1] The table is based on regions throughout the world. Rank in each instance is on the basis of either per person or per acre.

Conditions surrounding the area of lag may well be a problem for the soil scientists as they struggle to maintain

45. Enrich W. Zimmermann, World Resources and Industries (Harper and Brothers, New York, 1951) p. 192.

46. Zimmermann, op. cit., p. 192.

status of the other two divisions. The former may be aided by the recent research that has been poured into the field. The needed fertility that will go along way in overcoming the lag in the 'original per acre calories rate' may be accurately determined. Further, the pattern of such need can be determined more quickly for greater soil efficiency. Thus even for those areas often on the verge of starvation, there may soon flourish healthier populations, relieved tensions, and acquisition of nationalism proferring the avenues for world peace.

In January 1951, AEC undertook to issue general legal authorizations for use of isotopes. "On April 13, 1951, regulations of radioisotope distribution became effective and were published in the Federal Register (10 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 30). The regulations established instructions and standards governing the procurement, delivery, possession, use, transfer, and disposal of all isotopes (with the exception of source and fissionable materials) distributed through AEC facilities."[47] In this respect, AEC acts as a middleman, serving both the interests of the manufacturing laboratory and the isotope user. July of this same year witnessed further enlargement of export services as a result of the extension of AEC's scope to the international cooperation in science; Oak Ridge National Laboratories were allowed to receive materials

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47. U. S. AEC, op. cit., p. 35.

at Oak Ridge for exposure to neutron radiation in the nuclear reaction.

Even in the absence of international control of atomic energy, this phase of the program is deemed important in the foreign policy of the United States. Whereas, utilization of isotopes in the condition sold by the Commission will not advance appreciably their atomic energy programs. They will aid though, advancements in basic science, medicine, agriculture, and industry. One of the purposes of the "Point Four Plan" was to sponsor advances capable of being taken advantage of by foreign countries to the extent that they can eventually "go it alone." This is one of the most strengthening features in our foreign policy.

Another problem confronting AEC is that of patents. During the first 6 months of 1951, workers of AEC and contractor employees undertaking AEC work were granted 85 patents. AEC holds a total of 277 patents, or more. These are made available to industrial firms in the U. S. on a royalty free, non-exclusive basis. The patents were issued in the fields of general chemistry, uranium chemistry, for electronic devices, and for radiation detection apparatus.

To handle the problem of patents and inventions, a Patent Compensation Board has been organized. Its existence is derived from Section 11 of the Atomic Energy Act, published in the viz., Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 80

(13 F. R. 3457).[48] Purposes of the Board are to fix royalties, fix just compensation, fix awards to owners of patents, and inventions in certain areas of atomic energy development.

Safety Measures

One of the most important aspects of contractual considerations is that of safety. This single term may very well embrace health and safety (including also accidents and fires). Without careful effort in the handling of materials and accompanying or concommitant precautions, labor turnover might be enough to cause disutility. At one time, because of inadequate knowledge, there was actual fear on the part of workers. This latter lead to a statement in the New York Times by one of the atomic energy officials, which made known that "Wide spread fear and distrust of atomic energy was regrettable....the danger came from an atomic energy program 'over which we have no control, the sinister one, behind the Iron Curtain,'"[49] In a portion of AEC's Federal Employee policy is the statement, "Safety is an integral part of each job, and each employee is responsible for the safety phase of his work just as much as he is for any other phase."[50]

The broad imporatnce of these measures points to the curbing of accidents and the prevention of fires as being of

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49. New York Times, (Friday, April 4, 1952) p. 11

50. Ibid., p. 11.

greater than ordinary in atomic energy programs. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946, vividly states the responsibility of AEC, in which Congress charged it with the duty to take the needed steps for the protection of life and property from hazards arising in its work. Also, the contractors through which the AEC carries out its work are made to understand at the bargaining table that it must be done safely. Many unique problems arise within the industry, from activities as a result of the production of fissionable materials and laboratory research in the field. Radioactive materials may be both detrimental or harmful in their being handled and forged chemically. On the other hand, if care is exerted, either may be prevented or the effects avoided.

"By continuous analysis of each contractor's experience and by inspection, the Commission's field staffs measure the effect of the program. Where accidents increase the Comission's safety engineers work with the contractors to determine the cause. Corrective action may take many forms including refinement of personnel or supervisory practices, correction of the conditions creating the hazard, reexamination of engineering practices, and infrequently, disciplinary actions."[51]

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51. United States Atomic Energy Commission, AEC Contract Policy and Operations, (Washington, D. C., U. S. Superintendent of Documents, 1951) p. 85.

Recently, AEC contractors have earned some of the highest awards in the safety field. Among them are the National Safety Council Awards for Distinquished services and safety and the Joseph A. Holmes Safety Association (United States Bureau of Mines) award for excellent safety performance.

"The three AEC communities, Los Alamos, New Mexico; Oak Ridge, Tennessee; and Richland, Washington, have been given recognition for outstanding performances in activities such as traffic control, fire prevention, school safety, traffic law enforcement, and pedestrian protection from such organizations as the National Safety Council, National Fire Protective Association, Ul S. Chamber of Commerce, International Association of Chiefs of Police, and American Automobile Association."[52]

It has been evident that contractors performing the work for AEC have virtually built a record that bespeaks of an organizational program of accident prevention based upon pre-evaluation of the hazards and experiences from past losses.

The Politics of Civil Defense

Inherent in atomic bomb production are also, the defensive measures. These run head on into legal aspects. Since manufacture of each bomb by another nation raises additional threat to the security of free nations, it has become imperative to devise ways and means of protecting families and citi-

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52. U. S. AEC., op. cit., p. 87.

zens. One factor constantly prompting evaluation is that of locating communities; quoting a discourse,

> "The power to remove cities would need to be located in some central overall government. The Constitution of the United States does not specifically give the power to either the executive or the legislative branches of the government. On the contrary, cities are incorporated under charters granted by the state governments. The state constitutions do not grant powers to their branches of government to dictate the location of business or residences."53

Many have contended for a reduction of the size of cities, still others have expounded the need for moving factories, keeping in mind, a set of declines in real estate values, and a shrinking tax base for future improvements. There would be no end to the maladjustments of valuableness growing out of such a change. Usually, cities experiencung a decline in population, are good examples of depressional periods. Mass movements from American cities, even in a period of short emergency will certainly bring on such.

The portentousness of such a problem could hardly be successfully coped with by the Federal Government alone. Economic perturbance would be reminiscent of nomadic escapades. The experience of the French civilians fleeing the German hordes and facing their own armies in doing so, will remain in the annals of history as a lesson of chaotic and unorganized movement.

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53. The Politics of Atomic Energy, (New York, Woodrow Wilson Foundation, March 1946) p. 20.

Possibly everyone will agree then to the economics of prior planning as the only real solution to the threat. Unifying plans, embracing local, state, and Federal Governments for Civilian Defense must be carried through irregardless of prognostications of their continued absence. Comment in the Woodrow Wilson's Foundation's article asserts, "a collective effort of unprecedented size for peacetime would be required."[54] Illustative of such collective effort is the work of Arthur W. Wallander, New York City Director of Civilan Defense; he and his staff have solicited on accasions volunteers for field exercises and training for defense workers, as well as the general public. On April 3, 1952, however, a training exercise was held specifically for defense workers. In the drill was participation of 50,000 volunteers in twenty-five field exercises throughout the five boroughs. "In addition thousands of the remaining 431,309 enrolled defense workers are expected to make a token appearance at police stations, fire stations, schools or other assembly points to which they would go in an actual raid."[55] The Bronx area assumed that an atom bomb exploded 2500 feet in the air above the intersection of Bryant Avenue and 176th Streets. The defense workers simulated the evacualtion and treatment of victims at the Brooklyn water front,

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54. The Politics of Atomic Energy, op. cit., p. 20.

55. New York Times, (Thursday, April 3, 1952) p. 19.

an incident involved the theoretical explosion of an atomic bomb under water off Governors Island. Factors of defense were stimulated by a five mile wind blowing a radioactive mist caused by the burst.

President Harry S. Truman in his budget message to Congress for the fiscal year ended June 1953, stated "Although civil defense is primarily a state and local responsibility, the Federal Civil Defense Administration plays a key role in providing information, leadership, coordination, and financial assistance to state and local governments."[56] His request for Civil Defense was in the form of estimates, and was placed at 339 million dollars for the fiscal year 1953, compared with $44 million for 1952.

Though the figures seem huge for this phase of the economy, yet, it staggers the imagination to foresee the possibility of American factories left behind by workers, on a slow involuntary trek, on perhaps an eve, with smoke protruding and leaping out of its funnels. Then on the next morn, view in a backward glance only a trickle or the complete absence of that smoke, which bespoke of life in an industrial economy. Even as they move farther and farther away from their union headquarters and eventually the environs of their former employment, something positive must confront their children. No play thing is the conception of the "H" bomb, 1000 times more

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56. The Houston Post, (Tuesday, January 22, 1952) p. 2.

the atomic and capable of obliterating a city of 100,000 or more. Thus the increased expenditures seemed to have been proposed to institute a program that approaches ideal, for the funds will be expended also in programs designed to acquaint educational institutions with the Civilian Development.

Chapter II

FEDERAL LABOR LEGISLATION AND ATOMIC ENERGY PRODUCTION

Any division of industrial development necessitates the consideration of labor relations. This fact is recognized by all economists, due to the character of American industry. Effective labor relations are carried on by very small single proprietorship enterprises, which total more than half the number licensed to do business in the United States, without many of the complex problems. Once though, tens, hundreds and thousands of employees contend for certain rights, standards, and recognition on the one hand, and management for certain productive efficiency, output, public or consumer goodwill on the other hand, there are complexities that must be dealt with for their attainment.

Both workers and employers have had to overcome resistances, technical barriers, and vie for Government's fair and unbiased approval. For the more than 15,000,000 organized workers, its main interest is the "free flow" of commerce for the nations' welfare. In a more related sense,

> "We start with the observation that this country -thanks to its Constitution as judicially expounded, is one great free trade area. As Mr. Frankfurter remarked in Freeman v. Hewitt, 329 U. S. 252 (1946),
> ...(By a) course of adjudication unbroken through the Nation's history, (the court) applied the prin-

> ciple that the Commerse clause was not merely an authorization to Congress to enact laws for the protection and encouragement of commerce among the states, but by its own force created an area of trade free from interference by the states....A state is....precluded from taking any action which may fairly be deemed to have the effect of impeding the free flow of trade between states."1

Recent interpretative findings have shown that broader considerations mitigate the "interstate commerce clause" and in its stead emphasize "commerce." Commerce then is taken to mean the production of a considerable number of goods for sale or for consumption. Consumption affects the standard of living, living conditions, and the economy. Production, and the labor may take place in the same state boundaries, either per se, or as a result of technical corporateness. Production precedes consumption and to have it, workers must toil through planned and cooperative efforts.

Many industries, including atomic energy, fall in this category. Their established office may be in another area or state, and chartered in a particular state, either as a result of purchasing power or other influencing conditions. The only link may be several letters weekly and the annual or quarterly reports. Many cases tend to give weight to this emerging interpretation of the need for evaluation more closely of the decisions and the legislation affecting the many aspects, viz.,

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1. Charles Fairman, American Constitutional Decisions, (Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1948,1950) p. 229.

"NLRB v. Planters Manufacturing Company[2] (105 F. (2d) 750, 753 C. C. A. 4, 1939): Holding that where respondent competes in its sales in Virginia with manufacturers of similar containers whose plants are located in other States" then "the act is applicable to the respondent and the employees here involved."

"NLRB v. Henry Ford Trade School[3] (58 N. L. R. B. 1534 (1944): Trade school engaged, inter alia, in the manufacture and repair of tools for companies engaged in business affecting commerce."

Further, business may not be that of interstate but intra-state commerce. This is not an attempt to negate entirely the use by the National Government of the "commerce" clause of the Constitution, but rather to point reflective thinking to the "economic gap," a chasm which must be filled to solidify the path of atomic age theory and reasoning. The question of interstate and intra-state commerce was held out in the cases:

"NLRB v. Pacific Gas and Electric Company[4] (118 F. (2d) 780, C. C. A. 9, 1941): A radio station is an instrumentality of commerce, so power company supplying electricity to it "affects commerce."

"National Labor Relations Board v. Bankers Trust[5] Company (56 N. L. R. B. 1071): Safe deposit services to customers engaged in interstate commerce makes the statutes applicable to this bank."

2,3,4,5. Congressional Record, Senate,(Washington, D. C., Proceedings and Debates, 82nd Congress, 2nd Session, April 1, 1952, Vol. 98, No. 54) p. 3308.

> "United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Company (supra):[6] Holding at page 120 that the "marketing of a local product in competition with that of a like commodity moving interstate may so interfere with interstate commerce or its regulations to afford a basis for congressional regulation of the intra-state activity."

The production of the atomic bomb and atomic energy has been and will be for the national defense and public welfare. Bombs that are manufactured are stored by the Government. It has supreme power to regulate not only its manufacture but the character of the atomic energy industry for industrial use. Approval and clearance emanate from the AEC, whose power has been vested by Congress, the representative of the people. Thus very little interstate commerce takes place, after the finished product. But commerce does result, whether that of a Governmental defense or advanced defense economy, workers migration, or import of feeder materials or strategic ones. The result though is a synthetic problem dealing with a reverse situation for this product, previously dealt with, in the area of total industrial relations.

Billions of dollars have already been poured into atomic energy production and research, and many more will be. It seems therefore necessary to envision significant changes in the economy. For once part of the gap is closed, that between the normal economy and the advanced defense economy, the resulting one will not be entirely the character of either. A diffusion, yes, but clearly with ponts of distinct difference,

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6. Congressional Record, op. cit., p. 3308.

reminiscent perhaps of the pre-automobile era, the pre-radio era, or more recently the pre-television era. The latter, representing the striking applications of electronic advancements, in war and in peace.

This is the complicated situation faced by the American worker and his employer. Guiding them is the AEC, and its interest extends beyond the manufacture of bombs or the production of energy, but truly to the welfare of the employees. A consideration of the character of the employees should be taken into account. Meaning, that there are those employed on a permanent basis belonging to the organized unions, and there are those employed by Government engaged contractors, belonging to unions. Never before has there been such an intricate and tedious labor problem. Inherent in the atomic energy program are also four distinct factors:

1. Production and expansion of atomic energy for military use.

2. Production and expansion of atomic energy for industrial use (private enterprise); both national and international.

3. Conversion and development of peace-time use of atomic energy, if it is decided enough atomic energy bombs have been stockpiled.

4. If a long period of stockpiling will call for gradual replacement of older atomic bombs, or weapons.

In the initial development of the programs the facilities of the Wagner Act or the National Labor Relations Act were used, to limited degree. That is so far as the basic rights of workers are concerned relative to wages and hours. But

atomic energy in the United States initially was a project in which pertinent data was closely guarded. So much so that certain bargaining information could not be divulged, or it may have been that there had to be a voluntary acceptance of various kinds of offers.

The various unions are yet in an undecided frame of mind about their rights and protection of the finer points of bargaining considerations. The operation of the "conspiracy doctrine" in the Commonwealth v. John Junt case in 1842, seems to indicate the necessity for gearing philosophical and juridical thought more clearly in that respect. Looming is the giant question, of where should and does the government legally come in? Its guardian hand and influence maintains industrial peace and harmonious relationship for the capitalistic economy in the private enterprises, for the welfare of the workers, entreprenuers, and democratic development in keeping with the Constitutional guarantees. At times its functions may touch the peripheral aspects, due to the atomization of government and the economy. For the most part, these might be said to act as the buttress of the precipices in the economic gap, until the chasm can be filled with the more advanced and solid mature thinking.

Pre-War Relations

The aforementioned, may be pointed up as the problems of labor relations as they affect the individual workers or

workers acting as an individual entity. From these aspects all relations in labor must be dealt with. To properly treat them, a discussion might descend from the loft of the general, to a level of more specific relations. Initially, should be that of contractor relations and the AEC. AEC steadily developed machinery to aid contractors develop and maintain conditions and management which will encourage employees to work up to the limit of their ability. This responsibility is assigned to it under the Atomic Act of 1946.

Duties and services of the AEC fall under the following categories:

1. Security
2. Recruiting
3. Recruiting atomic energy workers
4. Coordinating a safety and fire protection program in the industry
5. Collection and distributing information on employment, wage, rates, and labor-management relations.

Next, the security program of AEC is by far the most important, because "within broad limits of (its) public policy each contractor determines his own personnel arrangements."[7] Important facts must be remembered about contracts on a cost basis and that is AEC as an administrator of such contracts reimburses contractors expenses, and must assure that public funds buy full value, and that working conditions are comparable to

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7. United States Atomic Energy Commission, AEC Contract Policy and Operations, (Washington, D. C., United States Superintendent of Documents) p. 72.

good practices in industry or in a certain locality.

Lastly, wartime labor relations on contracts of a cost nature were handled by Manhattan Engineer District. In "Research and operation, union recognition was deferred by intervention of MED. The National Labor Relations Board was requested not to process any petition for representation filed by unions."[8] Most of the construction work wage rates were governed by MED and Federal wage stabilization policies and contractors and unions maintained, well-recognized labor agreements, which did not interfere with the security of the program. In March 1946, restriction against union organization was lifted, and MED decided on permitting the NLRB to handle cases at Oak Ridge;

> "The board then published a description of the collective bargaining unit found to be appropriate. Elections were held in August 1946 in two plants and a laboratory in Oak Ridge. As a result, the United Gas, Coke, and Chemical Workers' Union of America of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) was certified as bargaining agent in the gaseous diffusion plant, and the Atomic Trades and Labor Council of the American Federation of Labor(AFL) in the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. In the electromagnetic separation plant at Oak Ridge the employees voted to reject union representation."[9]

Post War-Relations

There evolved a need for an interpretation of AEC's role relations between contractors and unions in the post war era. To serve in the solution of conditions arising out of

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8. United States AEC, op. cit., p. 75-76.

9. United States AEC, op. cit., p. 76.

such an interpretation a committee of three labor relation experts were elected, by the Commission. They were David Morse, George Taylor, and Lloyd Garrison. Their work was invaluable in analyzing proposed contracts negotiated after NLRB representation elections. The far-reaching report submitted on January 4, 1947, suggested the Commission be concerned only with the following phases in contracts:

1. labor expenditures
2. continuity of work, and
3. security matters.

Therefoe, the Wagner Act would be, it was held, fully operative in other phases, and interference with army, navy, and the traditional rights and privileges of American labor and its workers would be at a minimum.

Early in 1947, the first dispute took place between the C. I. O. and Carbide and Carbon Chemicals Corporation relative to working conditions. This dispute was not settled until a new contract was signed in the latter part of 1947.

Policy discussions brought a decision of "non-intervention" in 1948, as AEC pledged to intervene only the extent necessary to maintain conditions which are clearly unwarranted or substandard. Whereas, a contract had been signed previously with Carbide and Carbon Chemicals Corporation, it was found that the two major unions were at odds. "The CIO union, representing workers in the gaseous diffusion plants, was dedi-

cated to removing the differential" establishing in wages and working conditions during the war, and the AFL union, representing workers in the laboratory, to retaining it. Negotiations broke down early in March 1948. A threat of a strike caused the emergency measures of the Taft-Hartley Act (Labor-Management Relations) of 1947 to be invoked. When the Board of Inquiry had made its report, the Department of Justice secured an injunction compelling the status quo or the maintenance of existing conditions.

At the end of this 80 day period AEC intervened also directly, after the employees had overwhelmingly rejected the employer's offer. Several days later AFL leaders were successful in calling off the contemplated strike.

In a message to Congress on June 18, 1948, President Harry S. Truman announced his intention to appoint a Commission on Labor Relations in the atomic energy installations. Members of the Commission chosen by the President were William H. Davis, former chairman of the War Labor Board; Aaron Horvitz, New York lawyer and arbiter; and Edwin E. Witte, University of Wisconsin economics professor. John Dunlop, the Harvard University economics professor, was named as the Commission's consultant, and Donald B. Straus, of New York, as executive secretary.

After consultation with contractors, union leaders, AEC officials, the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, the Comis-

sion recommended nonintervention, subject to necessary limitations, in the normal aspects of wages, hours, working conditions, and collective bargaining. Major proposals were relative to the general welfare of workers in atomic energy programs and as integration of unions into plant organization as a "two-way channel of communication and a medium of understanding between management and workers."[10]

"The Davis report recommended that a Labor Relations Panel of three impartial members be appointed by the President and that the Panel be empowered to take jurisdiction of any management-labor dispute which collective bargaining and the normal processes of concilliation have failed to resolve and which threatens to interfere with an essential part of the atomic program."[11]

The exact recommendations appeared in a report of April 1949, as follows:

> "4. a. That all collective bargaining agreements at Government-owned, privately operated atomic energy installations provide that grievances and disputes involving the interpretation or application of the agreement will be settled without strikes, lockouts or other interruptions to normal operations by an effective grievance procedure, with arbitration as its final step unless the parties mutually agree upon some other method of assuring continuity of operations throughout the term of their agreement.
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> b. That, fully recognizing and safeguarding the primary responsibility of local representatives for

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10. United States AEC., op. cit., p. 79.

11. Ibid., p. 80.

sound and stable relations at each Government-owned, privately operated atomic energy installation, provision be made for bringing to bear upon the settlement of critical disputes all available experience and responsibility of individuals at the very highest levels of management and labor.

c. That, subject to the security provisions of paragraph 2 above, management and labor at Government-owned, privately operated atomic energy installations make every endeavor to determine bargaining units and representatives by agreement and consent election in preference to consented proceedings before the National Labor Relations Board.

d. That all Government-owned, privately operated atomic installations in which representatives have chosen by the workers and lawfully designated, or recognized by management, management and union cooperate to integrate the union into the plant organization as a two-way channel of communication and a medium of understanding between management and workers."12

These recommendations were accepted and the President appointed the same three as members of the commission, expanding it to six members on November 16, 1950.[13] "In September 1950, the Panel made recommendations to parties in the negotiation of an initial agreement between Bendix Aviation Corporation and International Association of Machinists, representing employees at the Kansas City Plant. More recent (than this), in November 1950, the Panel issued recommendations to Sandia Corporation, and the AFL union represent-

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12. United States Atomic Energy Commission, Report of the President's Commission on Labor Relations in the Atomic Energy Installations, (Washington, D. C., U. S. Printing Office, April 1949) p. 5-8.

13. Ibid., p. 8.

ing its production and maintenance of employees."[14]

The Commission decided on lifting its ban on contractor recognition of unions outside of Oak Ridge in September 1948. For almost two years afterwards there was no work stoppage. That occurring in the period had a significant absence of serious implications. Those among the operating personnel happened on May 15, 1950. At that time 34 atomic energy steamfitters walked out with about 350 steamfitters in General Electric's private operations at Schenectady. "The atomic energy employees returned to work on May 24, and the others remained out for almost two months. On September 5, 1950, the production and maintnance employees at the atomic energy installations in Schenectady remained out for half a day. And on August 8, 1950. about half of the employees in the bargaining unit at the Bendix plant in Kansas City walked off the job for half a day."[15] Several stoppages have been in the Construction projects. Once they have occurred though the Panel has been successful in ending many of them by asserting its jurisdictions after they affected a project.

That, normal collective bargaining is contradicted in the determination of proper and expedient solutions to problems in the field of labor relations, in more than one way

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14. Ibid., p. 5-8

15. U. S. AEC., op. cit., p. 81.

has been pointed out. Exceeding the area of loyalty usually contended for by the NLRB is that of security. Once the Commission has made certain that no findings violate security regulations then bargaining can commence. It however, retains final authority for security reasons.

Consistent with the Atomic Energy Act and the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, it is the settled policy of the AEC that atomic energy facilities be operated in a manner best calculated to assure those who participate in the program loyal to the United States. A statutory requirement is that of a full investigation by the FBI, with the final clearance by AEC. If there is alleged Communist Affiliation or association of unions or officials, the AEC is required to review the situation and offer the union officials an opportunity to clear up the matter.

Before September 1948, when cases were allowed to come before the board, strict secrecy was insisted upon. After that time, "the Atomic Energy Commission had worked out methods for holding these hearings in a normal way, open to the public without endangering security."[16]

However, the NLRB trial examiners are cleared for access of classified materials. At the proceedings a representative of the Commission attends the hearings to assist on security questions. The Commission has found it necessary to

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16. Ibid., p. 83.

clear and investigate fully the security risk of the assistant director of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. This is due to the need for certain information to be handed down to conciliation. The clearance for classified information assists in the giving of proper instructions and information.

A most serious question of loyalty to the United States arose in 1948, among officials of the United Electric Workers, affiliated at that time with the C. I. O. General Electric was directed to cease recognition of the union. For, that disloyal element among the officials caused them to be unfit to represent workers on atomic energy details in Schenectady. Though the officials of the union were not employees and therefore were not considered a threat to the security of the program.

On January 20. 1952, "the Atomic Energy Commission told a Senate Labor subcommittee (that) it knows of no legislative way to eliminate Communist dominated unions from AEC installations....The report reviewing the banning of two unions as bargaining agents for workers in AEC installations in 1948. These were the United Electrical Workers, at AEC plants managed by General Electric in Schenectady, N. Y. (mentioned previously); and the United Public Workers, at the Argonne National Laboratory at the University of Chicago. Both unions have been ousted by the Congress of Industrial Organizations

on the grounds they followed the Communist Party line rather than C. I. O. policy."[17]

One factor pointed up to eliminate some of the risk among the employees is that of personnel eligibility determination. The procedure for arriving at an individual's eligibility by the Commission was published in the Federal Register (15 F. R. 6241) January 5, 1949 and September 19, 1950. There were established two alphabetically designated categories, (A) and (B).

"Category (A) includes those classes of derogatory information which establish a presumption of security risk. In cases falling under this category the manager of Operations must refer cases to the Director of Security in Washington."[18]

"Category (B) includes those classes of derogatory information where the extent of activities, the attitudes, or conventions of the individual must be weighed in determinimg whether a presumption of risks exist. In these cases, the Manager of Operations must refer them to the Director of Security in Washington."[19]

These categories are used strictly by the Commission, and such use pays off in dividends of security. The importance of this aspect can not be emphasized too much, because the success of the program depends on it.

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17. The Houston Post, (January 20, 1952) p. 7.

18. U. S. AEC., op. cit., Appendix 5, p. 121.

19. Ibid., p. 121.

Chapter III

AN ANALYSIS OF CASES IN THE ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAMS

First Report of Panel

Cases pressing for favorable relations involved issues of working hours, wages, disputes between unions, general issues surrounding working conditions, and contracts. Entirely new is the area of isolation pay to the labor filed. It began in the contract agreements covering work on the Hanford Project. The origin of such pay can be found in the collective bargaining agreement of August 16, 1947;

> "Travel: It is recognized by Employer and Union that further consideration should be given to the problems of transportation and travel on the project because of the large area covered by it; it is agreed, therefore that the amount and the mode of handling same for work within the barricaded area shall be left open for negotiation with the signatory unions prior to commencing construction in the barricaded area.
>
> Subsequent negotiations amended the 1947 contract to include the subject of isolation pay which stated that: 'in lieu of any travel and of subsistence allowances, workers shall be granted isolation pay of $1.50 per day to employees living within North Richland and the Village of Richland.'"[1]

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1. United States Atomic Energy Commission, AEC Contract Policy and Operations, (Washington, D. C., U. S. Pringing Office, January 1951) p. 141.

These conditions did not surround cases handled exclusively by the Atomic Energy Labor Relations Panel alone. In its first six monts of existence, from the period June 1, 1949 to October 31, 1949, the Panel had four cases submitted to it. The Panel referred one of the cases back to the parties for further bargaining and was instrumental in settling another case before the fifteen day period of preliminary investigation had expired, In the two remaining cases, the Panel acted as mediator after first satisfying itself that the dispute threatened and essential part of the Atomic Energy Program and that the available agencies of conciliation had been fully utilized. Both of these cases were settled in the mediation stage of the Panel procedure, thus obviating the necessity for the Panel to issue recommendations.

In Case No.:, involved were the Monsanto Chemical Company and the United Gas, Coke, and the Chemical Workers, CIO, Local No. 420, at the Mound Laboratory, Miamisbury, Ohio. The dispute arose during the negotiatios over the first contract. The Union was certified by a consent election. The certification was dated May 10, 1949. The first meeting of the parties was on May 20, 1949 at which time the union submitted a proposed contract.

Meetings were held on June 7th, 8th, 14th, 15th, and 16th. By the last date, the parties were in agreement over

the bulk of the contract language, but negotiations broke down on issues in dispute. The Panel officially assumed jurisdiction on July 15th.

The Issues in Dispute at Date of Panel Entrance:[2]

Union Security: The union wanted a union shop. The company refused to grant a union shop on grounds that it was against company policy and that there was no union shop clause in any other atomic energy labor contract.

Continuity of operation: The union linked the no-strike clause to the union shop clause, refusing to make a no-strike pledge without assurance of union membership in the unit.

Retroactivity: The union wanted to date the certification to be the retroactive date. The company wanted the new rates to go into effect the day the contract was signed.

Shift differential: The union wanted shift differentials of 7¢ for the first night shift, 14¢ for the late night shift. The company offer wouldn't mention any figure until after wage rates were in agreement.

Wages: Company and union had reached agreement on an internal rate structure and job classifications. The wage disagreement was over the total cost of the increase. The last company offer averaged 15.3¢ and the last union demand averaged 22.3¢, a difference of 7¢.

The final settlement was; Shift differentials: 5¢ and 10¢. Union security: an irrevocable, voluntary checkoff for duration of contract. Continuity of operation: a standard no-strike clause. Retroactivity: to date when parties asked for Panel intervention.

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2. Atomic Energy Labor Relation Panel, Report for Period June 1 - October 31, 1949, (Washington, AEC) p. 3-6.

The background of Case No. 2, assumed a different but impressive character. This dispute arose during negotiations over a first contract. The parties were the Monsanto Chemical Company and the International Guards of America, at the Mound Laboratory in Miamisbury, Ohio. The bargaining unit covers all plant guards at the Mound Laboratory. The original certification named Mound Laboratory Patrol, Local #1, as the union.

Representatives of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service were at the Mound Laboratory on June 28th and 29th, in connection with another dispute....The union wanted a wage reopener after six months. The Company insisted upon a one year contract without a reopener. Both sides then withdrew their final offers and the union sent a letter to the Panel on August 10th requesting that it assume jurisdiction.

It is the procedure of the Panel to investigate the factual background of a case before actively engaging in its settlement. This preliminary investigation provides the Panel with as complete a "second hand" picture of the dispute as possible before embarking upon actual mediation. It also gives the facts upon which to determine whether or not to assume jurisdiction.[3]

Ordinarily, this preliminary investigation is made by

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3. Ibid., p. 6-8.

the Panel's secretary. In this case, a Panel member, Mr. Horvitz, accompanied the Panel secretary on this preliminary investigation. They went to Miamisbury on August 23rd, where they conferred with both parties---first separately and later jointly.

In the course of the talks, an agreement was reached based largely upon the compromise terms put forward during the August 5th meetings under the aegis of the Conciliation Service. Thus, technically, the Panel never officially participated in mediating this case.

As has been previously indicated few days have been lost by AEC workers compared to total time lost in man-hours in private industry. One of the longest was at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, in March of 1952. It lasted for 4 days, and construction resumed on "secret" atomic projects only after the shut down terminated, which had involved about twenty-five A. F. of L. truck drivers. "They had caused the walkout due to grievances. The walkout had made idle about 500 other A. F. of L. construction workers."[4]

Labor relations present a patchwork of problems in the American atomic energy industry, which will bring about new influences. Many will present a hue not immediately acceptable in regular organized union policy. But, it should be remembered that they are labor relations geared to a program

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4. New York Times, (April 2, 1952) p. 24.

that is unusual in our economy. Therefore, for proper perspective, problems should be viewed as they relate to the total labor relations picture of the atomic energy program.

Second Report of the Panel

The second report of the Atomic Energy Labor Relations Panel was for the period, November 1, 1949 to May 31, 1950, and clearly shows trends, which provided for the present experience of the Panel. This report includes the next six cases handled by the Panel and resulted in the settlement of the 1st case, also, handled in 1949. An approximately complete 'model case' is treated further in the discussion, though it was a part of the third report, for the purpose of showing the submissions of the two sides in bargaining procedures.

The philosphy developing from these first months of existence on the part of the Panel seemed to be embodied clearly in the remarks of the Chairman on one occasion: "The Panel does not consider itself a fire engine. The whole concept of the Panel is to establish procedures which will give time for rational negotiations. The object is to permit bargaining to take place without the threat of an imminent strike hanging over the heads of those doing the negotiating."[5]

With this purpose in mind, the Panel considers the job of creating a favorable atmosphere for successful collective bargaining to rank equally in importance with its job as a mediation agency. Before summarizing cases ten through twenty-two, model case No.19 clearly shows the bargaining value in

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5. Atomic Energy Labor Relations Panel, Report for Period, June 1, 1949-October 31, 1949, (Washington, D. C.,) p. 13.

the presentation of supporting arguments for both parties.

The plant of the case was the Hanford Works, Richland, Washington, Parties: General Electric Co.; Hanford Atomic Metals Trades Council (AFL).[6]

"The events leading up to the assumption of jurisdiction by the Panel were set forth in our previous report.

The Panel met with the parties at the Hanford Works, Richland, Washington, during the week of December 18, 1950."[7] The dispute was over the amount of a wage increase to be negotiated under a wage reopening clause. The union requested 20 cents per hour, and the company's offer was 3 per cent, of 5.6 cents, which, on top of a 3 per cent increase paid in May of 1950, would have brought the total increase for 1950 up to 6 percent.

The company supported its offer with the following major arguments:

1. The proposed increase was slightly above the company-wide pattern of increases negotiated with other unions in its private operations;

2. Based on the BLS Consumer's Price Index for the Richland area, the 3 percent more than compensated for the post-Korean war increase which, as of November 1, amounted to 217 percent;

3. According to the company survey, wage rates at the Hanford Works were already 10 percent above the area, and the company offer would boost the Hanford rates 13 percent above the area.

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6. United States Atomic Energy Commission, Major Activities of the Atomic Energy Programs, (Washington, D. C., U. S. Superintendent of Documents, 1951) p. 137.

7. Ibid., p. 137.

The union based its demands on the following major points:

1. The 3 percent negotiated in the spring was meant specifically to compensate for a rent increase which had occurred in August of 1949, and therefore should not be considered part of the 1950 package;

2. Although the BLS survey indicated a rise of only 2.7 percent, a privately conducted union survey revealed an increase closer to 11 percent;

3. While the wage level at Hanford was admittedly above the level of wages in the surrounding area for similar jobs, the differential since 1947 had been considerably narrowed. The union contended that the original differential should be maintained.

"....on December 20, 1950, the Panel concluded that no agreement could be obtained.

Accordingly, on January 22, 1951, the Panel recommended that; The company's offer to be accepted, i. e., a wage increase of 3 percent of the rates in effect on July 2, 1950, with a minimum of 4 cents an hour, to be effective September 18, 1950."[8]

In issuing responsibility to the Panel it had to decide how the change in living costs for families in Richland is to be measured. Facts brought to light that the best available measure is the BLS study published early in November 1950.

On February 23, 1951, the Panel received word that the parties had executed a formal agreement providing for the wage

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8. United States AEC., op. cit., p. 138.

adjustments recommended."[9]

Summary of Cases - Ten Through Twenty-Three

A summary of all other cases in which the assistane of the Panel was sought, covers the period inclusive of May 1951. Experience of the Panel placed solution under several heads. These were:

1. Direct negotiations
2. Panel recommendations
3. Aid of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service of the NLRB
4. Panel mediation
5. A combination of Panel Mediation followed by Panel recommendations

Exemplifying these are the results found in the cases for the period in which they occurred, viz.:

Case No. 10-AEC Installations:[10]

Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, Schenectady; Parties: General Electric Co.; United Association of Plumber and Steamfitters (AFL).

As of May 31, 1950, the parties had met with the Panel and had agreed to return to Schenectady for further negotiations.

Only July 11, the Panel received a letter from the company advising it that an agreement had been reached with the union and a new contract had been signed.

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9. United States Atomic Energy Commission, AEC Contract and Policy Operations, (Washington, D. C., U. S. Superintendent of Documents, 1951) p. 129.

10. Ibid., p. 129-131.

Case No. 11-AEC Installations:[11]

Oak Ridge, Tennessee, K-25 Plant; Parties: Carbide and Carbon Chemical Division, Union Carbide and Carbon Corporation, United Gas, Coke and Chemical Workers of America (CIO) Local 288.

Background of Dispute:

On May 26, 1950, the Panel received a telegram from Martin Wagner, president of the United Gas, Coke and Chemical Workers of America, stating that negotiations between the union and the company had reached an impasse and indicating that the union was prepared to "take any action it deems necessary to enforce its demands after the expiration of its current contract of June 9, including authorization of a strike."[12]

On June 15th the Panel met with the parties in Oak Ridge. At that time the following issues were in dispute:

1. Genral wage increase
2. Severance pay feature to be added to company's pension plan offer
3. Life and accident insurance to be paid in full by the company
4. Hospitalization plan
5. Wage inequities in the power house, and for instrument mechanics, pipefitters, welders, utility mechanics, millwrights, and operators.
6. Thirteen maintenance classifications
7. Combination of operator and operator leader classification in Process Department

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11. Ibid., p. 131.

12. Ibid., p. 131.

8. Combination of barrier operator and barrier attendant classification with an additional increase in rate barrier operator

9. 5 cents to be added on all skilled trades classifications

10. Extension of the contract

"At the request of the Atomic Energy Commission on June 5, 1950, the Panel assumed jurisdiction and met with the parties at Oak Ridge on June 15th. At the suggestion of the Panel, direct collective bargaining negotiations were resumed. In these continued negotiations, with some help by the Panel, many items in dispute were resolved. As to the unresolved items the Panel recommends:

> 'That the revised wage schedule should include, in addition to the wage inequity adjustments and the revised job classification and progressive schedules agreed to by the parties in their negotiations, a general wage increase of 5 cents per hour, and that the classification of barrier attendant be eliminated by placing all employees so classified in the higher-rated job of barrier operator to be rated in group 8 at $1.60 an hour.'

In making its recommendations for a wage increase and for an extension of the term of the contract the Panel has had very much in mind in this stabilization improvement in relative wage relationships, the marked increase in productive efficiency, to which the workers have undoubtedly made their contribution in developing skill with experience and in devoting to their work, and the importance in the present juncture of world affairs of establishing and maintaining stable and

highly productive labor relations."[13]

The Panel recommendations were accepted by both parties and incorporated in a new contract.

Case No. 12-AEC Installation:[14]

Oak Ridge, Tennessee, X-10 Laboratory; Parties: Carbide and Carbon Chemicals Division, Union Carbide and Carbide and Carbon Corporation; Atomic Trades and Labor Council (AFL).

On June 30, 1950, the Panel received a telegram from the union requesting that it intervene in a dispute at the X-10 .aboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The Panel met with the parties in Oak Ridge on July 27th and 28th. As in the case of the K-25 dispute, the relationships between these two Oak Ridge facilities created a major difficulty in the negotiations. The wage discussions involved both an across-the-board increase as well as the adjustment of differences between certain X-10 classifications and those of K-25. There were several other issues in dispute, however, it was evidnet that those could not be quickly resolved once the major and usual question of wages was settled.

On July 28th the Panel succeeded in getting from the union a package proposal which would resolve the inequity problem. On August 17th the Panel issued a recommendation, for resolving the dispute. The comments in this recommendation, and the general wage increase, were identical to the

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13. Ibid., p. 131-132.

14. Ibid., p. 132.

one issued in the K-25 case and quoted under Case No. 11. Both parties accepted this recommendation and embodied it in a new agreement.

Case No. 13-AEC Installation:[15]

Oak Ridge, Tennessee; Parties: Maxon Construction Company and J. A. Jones Construction Company; International Association of Bridge; Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers (AFL) Local 384.

On July 21, 1950, the Panel received a letter from the union requesting permission to deal through the Panel in the matter of wages for their members at Oak Ridge. In making this request the union said that the employers were unwilling to negotiate directly with the union since they were members of the local chapter of the Associated General Contractors, and, therefore, subject to the joint area negotiations between this association and the union.

In the background of this dispute was an arbitration award of 13 cents covering the International Hod Carriers. Within a few days the Panel received telegrams from both companies and the unions, indicating a willingness to comply with the suggestion for arbitration.

On September 20, 1950, the Panel received the following telegram from the union:

> "Inasmuch as J. A. Jones Construction Company, and Maxon Construction Company, who are performing work on the Oak Ridge, Tennessee, Atomic Energy Commis-

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15. Ibid., p. 132-133.

sion project have agreed to by Local No. 384 and the Knoxville, Tennessee, Associated General Contractors, we are hereby withdrawing our request for wage arbitration as incorporated in our wire of August 15, 1950."[16]

Case No. 14-AEC Installation:[17]

Oak Ridge, Tennessee, K-29 and K-31 Projects; Parties: Maxon Construction Company; International Teamsters Union, Local 621 (AFL).

On August 3, 1950, the Panel received a joint letter from the company and the union, requesting that the Panel enter a dispute involving material checkers on the K-29, K-31 projects. On August 15th the Panel wrote to both parties drawing attention to the provision of the Report to the President which recommended that all available experience and responsibility of individuals at the very highest levels of management be brought to bear upon the settlement of disputes in atomic energy. The letter then suggested that this dispute be referred to the international president of the union and the top executives of the company for further negotiations.

The Panel heard nothing further from either party concerning this matter, and considers the case closed.

Case No. 15-AEC Installation:[18]

Hanford Project, Richland, Washington; Paries: Atkinson Jones Construction Company; Office Employees International Company; Office Employees International Union (AFL).

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17. Ibid., p. 132-133.

18. Ibid., p. 133.

On August 16, 1950, the Panel received a request from the union that it intervene in a dispute between it and the Atkinson Jones Construction Company. The telegram stated that the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service had participated in the negotiations but had been unable to achieve a settlement. The dispute was over the renewal of an existing agreement.

On August 17th Panel sent a telegram to both parties saying that it had initiated its envestigation of the case, and requesting that the parties continue negotiations under the auspices of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. On August 31st the Panel was informed by the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service that an agreement had been reached between the parties.

In closing the case the Panel wired to the company and the union as follows: "The Panel thanks both parties for their cooperation in this critical matter and congratulates them for reaching an agreement through collective bargaining."[19]

Case No. 16-AEC Installation:[20]

Sandia Laboratory, Albuquerque, New Mexico; Parties: Sandia Corporation, subsidiary of Western Electric Company; Atomic Projects and Production Workers, Metal Trades Council (AFL).

On August 17, 1950, the Panel received a request from

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19. Ibid., p. 134.

20. Ibid., p. 134.

the union indicating that the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service had with drawn from negotiations and requested that the Panel assume jurisdiction. On August 18th the Panel replied that it would begin its investigation of the background of the dispute and would let the parties know within 15 days concerning further handling of the matter.

A ful meeting of the Panel members was held in New York on Saturday, October 28th to review all of the facts and to propose recommendations.

These recommendations covered both the controversial job evaluation plan and the vacation schedule. They also proposed a wage structure which incorporated a general wage increase. Numerous other issues were referred back to the perties for further bargaining.

As of November 30th the parties were still in negotiation.

Case No. 17-AEC Installation:[21]

Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, Schenectady; Parties: General Electric Company; International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, Local 301 (CIO).

On August 22nd the Panel received a letter from local 301, enclosing a resolution requesting the Panel to intervene in a dispute between it and the General Electric Company.

In its reply the Panel drew the attention to the local

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21. Ibid., p. 134-135.

officers to Section 4 (b) of the report of the President's Commission, (See Case No. 14), on matters in dispute.

On the morning of Tuesday, September 5th, the officers of Local 301 called their men out on strike. This interruption was halted by union action within 2 hours before there had been any significant effect of the work at the laboratory.

The Panel heard nothing further concerning this matter. The dispute was eventually settled along with the national agreement signed between General Electric Company and the International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, CIO.

Case No. 18-AEC Installation:[22]

Bendix Aviation Corporation, Kansas City Division: Parties: Bendix Aviation Corporation; International Association of Machinists, Lodge 314.

On August 31st the Panel received a telegram signed jointly by the company and the union stating that they had failed to reach agreement over the terms of an initial contract and requested the Panel to take jurisdiction.

In deadlock on the 14th of September were the issues of; shift differential; union security; vacations; sick leave; wages; and retroactivity. In view of the mounting unrest in this vital facility the parties requested the Panel to take jurisdiction.

After deliberation the Panel decided to issue an offi-

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22. Ibid., p. 135.

ial recommendation for an across-the-board increase of 10 cents per hour. This recommendation was immediately accepted by both negotiation committees. A contract was signed shortly after the union ratification meeting was held the following week.

Case No. 20-AEC Installation:[23]

Los Alamos, New Mexico; Parties: International Brotherhood Electrical Workers, Local 611 (AFL); International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 9 (AFL).

On October 13th the Panel received a letter from the International Union of Operating Engineers setting forth a dispute between it and the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, over the maning of steam generating and a power plant operated by the Zia Company at Los Alamos, New Mexico.

The Panel suggested a meeting between the general presidents of each union, under the auspices of the Panel, to seek "either a solution or some agreed procedure for settling the dispute."[24] Although the proposal for a meeting met with their approval, the first mutually convenient date for such a meeting was early in December, almost two months later.

As of November 30, 1950, this matter is still pending.

Case No. 21-AEC Installation:[25]

Hanford Project, Richland, Washington; Parties: Atkin-

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23. Ibid., p. 136.

24. Ibid., p. 136.

25. Ibid., p. 136.

son-Jones Construction Company; International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL, Local 370.

Matters were brought first to the attention of the Panel by a telegram received on November 24, 1950, from William E. Maloney, General President of the International Union of Operating Engineers. His message between the companies indicated that there had been a breakdown in negotiations between the operating engineers and the Atkinson-Jones Construction Company at the Hanford Project over the terms of a renewed agreement. Wages were not in dispute, since they had already been established, although not yet put into effect, in accordance with an area agreement between this Union and the Associated General Contractors.

After negotiations, the open items were the Union's request for contract language which would (1) assure a qualified operator and oiler on duty to operate and assist mechanics in making filed repairs of in changing attachments on shovels and draglines and other heavy equipment, and (2) forbid the assignment of work under the jurisdiction of the Operating Engineers to foremen belonging to any other union.

At the meeting in New York, Panel mediation resulted in a Company proposal for meeting the union demands on all essential points, with the proviso that the contents be put in a letter of understanding rather than in the body of the contract. The Union representatives reacted favorably to the proposal, but said that they would have to take it back to

the membership for approval. On February 16, the Panel received a letter from President Maloney indicating that an agreement had been reached, and this case was there upon closed.

Case No. 22-AEC Installation:[26]

Sandia Laboratory, Albuquerque, New Mexico; Parties: Sandia Corporation, subsidiary of Western Electric Company; Local 251; Office Employees International Union, AFL.

Panel assistance in a controversy between the Sandia Corporation and Local 251 of the Office Employees International president of the Union, on January 25, 1951. A Panel meeting was scheduled for February 14 in New York City. This dispute was over the terms of an initial agreement. The Office Workers unit was certified by the NLRB on September 8, 1950.

On March 21, 1951, the Panel issued its recommendations for the settlement of the matter. After several bargaining sessions there still remained some diaagreement of the interpretation of the intent of the Panel recommendations. In addition the parties were unable at first to agree upon a procedure for submitting the cost items to the Wage Stabilization Board for approval. By April 14, 1951 with the aid of the Panel, the matters of interpretation were clarified and the necessary steps for Wage Stabilization Board approval were initialed. As of June 1, Wage Stabilization Board action was still pending.

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26. Ibid., p. 136.

Chapter IV

CASE REPORT FOR PERIOD[1]

JUNE 1, 1951 - DECEMBER 1, 1951

During the period June 1, 1951 to December 1, 1951 the Atomic Energy Labor Relations Panel closed its files on nine cases. As of December 1 two cases were still open, bringing the total number of cases considered by the Panel during the period covered by the report to eleven. Since its origin in May of 1949 the Panel has taken part in 33 cases.

Disputes in construction required for the first time a large amount of the Panel's attention. Of the eleven cases handled five involved construction projects. In two of these prolonged strikes preceded the Panel's intervention. The rising incidence of construction cases, punctuated as some were with strike action preceding the entrance of the Panel, tended to call for a review of the Panel's role in the atomic energy building program.

When the President's Commission on Labor Relations in the Atomic Energy Installations wrote its report in the winter of 1949 there was relatively little building activity.

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1. Atomic Energy Labor Relations Panel, Case Report for Period - June 1, 1951 - December 1, 1951, (Washington, D. C., U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, 1952).

The program was largely confined to the facilities which were either fully completed or at least begun while World War II was still being fought. The construction then going on was largely for the duplication or modification of existing facilities. In the then existing climate of international affairs the building of new plants did not have the same urgency as production in the existing plants. During the first two years of the Panel's existence there were numerous strikes in construction that were not referred to the Panel and which, in the opinion of the Panel and the Atomic Energy Commission, did not constitute a serious enough threat to the national interest to require the Panel to assume jurisdiction on its own motion. In those instances where the national interest appeared to be in jeopardy the Panel sought, and in all instances immediately obtained, full cooperation from the top leadership of the A. F. of L. to bring the work stoppage to an end.

Since the start of the Korean War the construction of new facilities greatly increased the urgency of the building program at least equally to that of the production program. The increased amount of construction, and the national interest in its speedy completion, were factors in the Panel's stepped-up activity in this phase of the program. There had also been evidence of a renewed awareness on the part of both managements and unions involved in the atomic energy building

program of the serious consequences of work interruptions. The last two construction cases handled by the Panel had been referred to it by the parties. In one of these a brief interruption occurred before the Panel took jurisdiction; in the other no work stoppage took place.

The Panel continued to be guided by Section 3 of the Report of the President's Commission which recommended that "subject to the Atomic Energy Commission's responsibility under the law and to the limitations (of the national interest), the normal and typical aspects of wages, hours, and working conditions which are the substance of collective bargaining between private employers and non-governmental employees shall in Government-owned, privately operated atomic energy installations be left to collective bargaining between management and labor free from governmental interference. For the first time in its history, the Panel told one union and employer in a production facility that a strike arising out of their dispute would be of insufficient importance to the entire program to warrant Panel interference and that, accordingly, they were released until otherwise notified from their respective no-strike, no-lockout pledges so far as that dispute was concerned. In another case the issue was referred back to the parties for further bargaining and was subsequently resolved by them without Panel assistance. In still another case the Panel sent the parties back to gather

further data and assigned a Panel member to give assistance in preparing this factual data for their further bargaining. If the dispute remains unresolved after further negotiations in the light of this new data the Panel member will prepare a report upon which the full Panel will prepare a recommendation.

During the six months covered by this report the Panel also had its first experience with the issuance of wage recommendations in the light of Wage Stabilization policies. The Panel has in its custody a no-strike pledge covering this uniquely important industry and its belief that the advantage should be preserved and utilized to the full. To get this result the Panel has an obligation to turn over every stone that it can to uncover equitable ideas of settlement, and to use all means of persuasion to bring the parties together. It has, therefore felt a responsibility to mediate in wage disputes and, within the limits of wage stabilization policy fixed by the Wage Stabilization Board, even to make wage recommendations where necessary. At the same time the Panel will not encroach upon the field of wage stabilization policy-making. The parties are not allowed to forget their responsibility to get Wage Stabilization Board approval for whatever wage agreements they may eventually reach. With these principles in mind the Panel members initiated a close and personal liaison with the members of the Wage Stabilization Board. This liaison will be maintained in order to

preserve the essential elements of wage stabilization and the best elements of mediation.

There follows a summary of the cases handled by the Panel during the period covered by this report;[2]

CASE NO.: 17

AEC INSTALLATION: Knolls Laboratory Schenectady

PARTIES: General Electric Company
International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, Local 301 (CIO)

The early history of this case was related in a previous report. On June 7 and 8 the Panel held hearings in Schenectady. The most urgent unresolved issue was the union's claim for added compensation in certain areas where the workers were required to wear protective clothing. The union argued that in spite of the health precautions there was a residual health hazard. This claim the company vigorously denied, citing statistics to prove that the Laboratory was one of the safest places to work throughout the General Electric establishments. The union also argued that the discomfort of wearing the necessary protective equipment merited additional compensation of ten percent. In one area, for example, special breathing masks must be worn in order to keep radioactive substances from being inhaled.

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2. Atomic Energy Labor Relations Panel, Case Report for Period - June 1, 1951 - December 1, 1951, (Washington, D. C., U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, 1952) (Resume)

The Panel members thoroughly explored the union's allegations and entered the areas under discussion wearing the required equipment. Upon this first-hand experience, and upon further detailed study of the comparative safety statistics which were put into the record without challenge, the Panel issued a recommendation on June 29 which said in part:

> "The Panel finds that there is no unusual health hazard in --- the Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory; that the protective clothing required for work in the 'hot' areas is uncomfortable, but not sufficiently to produce a substantial inequity between those who must wear it for a portion of their working day and those who never need to put it on."

Other items in dispute were 1) a change in a day shift working hours; 2) automatic progression schedules for skilled workers; and 3) pay for the Labor Day holiday, September 4, 1950 for 95 employees whose pay was withheld by the company due to a work stoppage. The Panel recommended that the requested schedule shift be granted, that the company-wide system of progression schedule shift for skilled workers should remain unaltered at the Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, and tht all employees who reported for duty at 8 A. M. on September 5, 1950 (the day after the holiday) should be paid for that holiday.

CASE NO.: 23

AEC INSTALLATION: Hanford Project, Richland, Washington

PARTIES: Guy F. Atkinson Company and J. A. Jones Construction Company; Pasco-Kennewick Building & Construction Trades Council Negotiation Committee

The early history of this dispute, together with a report of the Panel hearings, was contained in another report. On June 28th, the Panel issued recommendations which said, in part:

> "Its (the Panel's) analysis reveals that this isolation pay agreement at the Hanford Works, both in respect to its amount and its duration, rests on no objective or measurable criteria, but is rather a unique product of collective bargaining depending upon the agreement and understanding of people who have a long history of successful relationships. No generalizations can be applied to this agreement, and therefore no outside individual or group of individuals can with reason alter the arrangement, ----'For the above reasons the Panel concludes that it should issue -- no recommendations in respect to the unions' request for an increase in job isolation pay."

The recommendations preserved the status quo until the termination of the contract in August. During the ensuing negotiations the parties again became deadlocked over the issues of isolation pay and referred them to the Panel again in October.

CASE NO.: 24

AEC INSTALLATION: Paducah, Kentucky

PARTIES: F. H. McGraw & Company
Sheet Metal Workers' International Association, Local Union 110

On September 20 the Atomic Energy Commission asked the Panel to intervene in a labor dispute at Paducah, Kentucky between F. H. McGraw & Company and the Sheet Metal Workers' International Association. The Atomic Energy Commission's telegram stated that the dispute involved a request for an allowance, either in terms of subsistence, travel or higher rates, to increase earnings above established area rates. The

telegram ended as follows:

> "We are informed that the Sheet Metal Workers' Union has interested other crafts and that similar demands for increased compensation over and above area rates and conditions will be made known by a number of other crafts today and we are further advised that a strike ----will occur at the beginning of work this morning."

Within a few hours the above telegram was supplemented by an announcement from the Atomic Energy Commission that the Paducah job was "100% closed" due to a picket line.

The Panel immediately sent telegrams to Richard J. Gray, President of the A. F. of L. Building & Construction Trades Department, to William Green President of the American Federation of Labor, and to four international presidents, which requested these officials to "exert your authority to return the men to work immediately." Before the end of the day the Panel had received assurance from many of these officials that they would take immediate steps to call off these work stoppages.

Nevertheless, it took several days to return the men to full production and on September 25 Gordon Dean, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, made a personal appeal to William Green of the American Federation of Labor, and to the prime contractors at both Paducah, Kentucky and at the Dana Project, Newport, Indiana (where another work stoppage was in progress - - see case #29). In this appeal he drew attention to some 29 work stoppages which had occurred since

July 14 and which had cost the atomic energy program substantially over half a million lost man hours. To all parties concerned Chairman Dean said: "the solution of this problem is imperative and the cooperation of all concerned is required."[3]

By September 27 full production had been resumed and the Panel announced that it would hold a meeting with the parties to discuss the issues in dispute on October 10 in Washington. The principal issue in dispute was over subsistence pay. When the job opened in April, 1951 both parties agreed that the Louisville contract should apply to the work of Paducah. The Sheet Metal Workers claimed that the clause in this contract stipulationg $5 per day subsistence for work performed beyond the normal commuting distance of a "shop" was applicable to the McGraw job, contending that the location of the McGraw "shop" was Louisville where much of the recruiting was done. The company claimed that its "shop" was right at Paducah and that there should therefore be no subsistence pay....After lengthy discussions and one work stoppage, an agreement between the company and the union was reached which established a compromised journeyman's rate of $2.62½ per hour. The agreed upon rate was .27½¢ above the Louisville rate and eliminated any past and future claim

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3. Ibid., p. 7

for travel, transportation and subsistence by the union. This rate was then subitted to the Construction Industry Stabilization Commission of the Wage Stabilization Board where the rate of $2.62½ was disapproved on the grounds that it exceeded the area practice. The union then reverted to its original demand of $5 per day for travel and subsistence allowance.

After the Panel had listened to the arguments of both sides, the union asked for an opportunity to negotiate again with the company without Panel assistance. Thereupon the Panel withdrew from the conference room and after an hour conference the parties again reached agreement, this time on the Louisville rate plus $2.20 per day subsistence (an arrangement equal in amount to an hourly rate of $2.62½). They further agreed to submit it, a new request for approval, together with additional facts to support it, to the Wage Stabilization Board. A memorandum of agreement was later approved by the Wage Stabilization Board.

CASE NO.: 25, 26, 27.

AEC INSTALLATION: K-25 Plant, X-10 Laboratory and Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

PARTIES:

Company: Carbide and Carbon Chemical Company
Unions: K-25 Plant-The United Chemical Workers, CIO, Local 288 (Case #25)
X-10 Laboratory - The Atomic Trades and Labor Council, AF of L (Case #26)
Y-12 Plant - The Atomic Trades and Labor Council, AF of L (Case #27)

The Carbide and Carbon Chemicals Company operated the

three main facilities of Oak Ridge: The Oak Ridge National Laboratory (CIO), and the K-25 and Y-12 production plants: Cases number 25, 26, and 27 all involve the Carbide and Carbon Chemicals Company and the unions representing the employees in these facilities. Since the principal issue in dispute was identical in these cases, they are reported here under one heading. Generally, they were concerned with the wage clause of the agreements, in cases where no bargaining had taken place.

On November 20. the Panel issued recommendations for individual job rates for all three facilities, as well as grouping of job titles.

CASE NO.: 28

AEC INSTALLATION: Oak Ridge, Tennessee

PARTIES: Roane-Anderson Company
United Gas, Coke & Chemical Workers of America, CIO, Local #439

On August 3 the Panel was asked by the local union officers of the United Gas, Coke & Chemical Workers, CIO, to intervene in a dispute between it and the Roane-Anderson at Oak Ridge over the terms of a new contract covering various custodial employees. The Panel learned that the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service were still handling this case and that, as yet, no international officers had participated. The Panel advised the international office of the Chemical Workers of these facts. On August 8 counsel for the

international renewed the union's request for Panel intervention, asserting that all possible steps had been taken to resolve the controversy. Further check by the Panel showed that due to the absence of negotiators on both sides only one joint conference under the jurisdiction of the Mediation Service had been held and that further meetings were scheduled. The Panel therefore again declined to interfere in th negotiations. Shortly thereafter a contract between the parties was signed.

CASE NO.: 29

AEC INSTALLATION: Dana Project, Newport, Indiana

PARTIES: Girdler Corporation
United Association of Plumbers & Pipefitters, AF of L, Local #157

During the summer months, a series of work interruptions occurred on construction at two new atomic energy installations - one at Paducah, Kentucky and the other at the Dana Construction Project, Newport, Indiana. As reported in connection with Case 24, Gordon Dean, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, felt the situation to be sufficiently serious on September 26 to warrant direct action on his part. On that day he issued a letter to the union and contractors involved calling on them to resume production in the national interest. Not since the summer of 1948, when David Lilienthal then AEC Chairman went directly to the top councils of the AF of L to forestall a strike at the X-10

Laboratory, had the chief executive of the Atomic Energy Commission participated officially in the labor relations of the atomic program.

On October 5 the Atomic Energy Commission informed the Panel that a work stoppage of approximately 1500 pipefitters had been in progress for over a month at the Dana Project and asked that the Panel intervene. On the following day the Panel sent telegrams to both parties setting a date for a meeting calling upon the United Association of Plumbers and Pipefitters, A. F. of L. to return its members to work.

On October 8, Martin Durkin, president of the United Association, replied by asking the Panel the following questions:

> "I wish to know if Building Trades Union have a right to strike on atomic energy projects.... I wish to know if Building and Construction Trades Department on behalf of the international unions' members thereof agreed to submit cases involving building and construction on atomic energy projects to your Panel?"

The Panel replied as follows:

> "The Panel has never questioned anyone's right to strike but the Panel has understood that the AF of L has voluntarily agreed to defer strike action pending mediation efforts of the Panel. The Panel has also understood that this agreement covers construction and in fact this has never been challenged. Under these circumstances we now repeat our request that you get the men to return to work at Dana and thus put an end to a critical and immediate national emergency. The Panel can then discuss with you on Wednesday the question raised in dispute."

By October 10, the date set for the Panel meeting, full activ-

ity had been resumed on the job.

The main issue in this dispute was over the retroactive payment of travel pay. The Girdler Corporation increased its pipefitter rate last spring to $2.47½ per hour, the maximum it considered allowable under the wage stabilization regulations. The union contended that the rate should be $2.50 as negotiated by the Master Plumbers of Terre Haute. The union also demanded in addition the 5¢ per mile travel pay which was area practice. Before giving the union an answer the corporation asked for a ruling from the Wage Stabilization Board whether the payment of this benefit could not be approved. On May 3 the pipefitters walked off the job in a "wildcat" strike. Negotiations were resumed after the men returned to work on May 7 and a settlement was reached relative to the conditions on June 1 for a rate of $2.60 per hour, such rate to be paid without additional compensation for travel expenses. This new agreement then submitted to the Construction Industry Stabilization Commission of the Wage Stabilization Board, when passed upon in due time, and on August 21 the CISC denied approval of the $2.60 rate and approved in its place a rate of $2.50 an hour plus the payment of 5¢ a mile travel expense. The corporation started paying this new rate and travel expense on August 21. The union claimed that the corporation should have paid the 5¢ per mile travel pay retroactive to March 19 (the date of the area con-

tract which established the $2.50 rate plus the 5¢ per mile allowance). The dispute before the Panel was over the retroactivity claimed by the union between March 19 and August 21.

During its mediation efforts the Panel explored the possibility of reviving the original $2.60 agreement, believing that further development of the fact might obtain CISC approval. The Panel was prepared to urge this settlement but discovered that it was no longer acceptable. Since agreement could not be reached in mediation, the Panel recommended a retroactive date of June 1, 1951 (the day on which the rate of $2.60 was agreed to in lieu of travel pay) for payment of the 5¢ per mile travel pay. After further negotiations, both parties agreed to this arrangement and the Construction Industry Stabilization Commission approved it.

During the Panel meeting of October 10, Martin Durkin repeated the questions contained in his telegram of October 8 with reference to the Panel's jurisdiction over construction. He made it clear that the officers of the United Association of Plumbers and Pipefitters had not felt themselves bound by the no-strike pledge given to the Panel by A. F. of L. president William Green, and he further voiced the opinion that this view was held by other crafts of the Building Trades Department. President's Green pledge, according to Durkin applied solely to production which is under the jurisdiction of the Metal Trades Department.

Panel Chairman Davis accepted Mr. Durkin's statement as an accurate expression of the Building Trades' Understanding of the Green pledge. At the same time he made it clear that the Panel itself had been under the impression that the pledge covered all essential atomic energy programs. Since the Panel plan rest solely upon voluntary agreement, this honest misunderstanding was in itself sufficient to modify the pledge so far as the Building Trades were concerned. At the same time, the practical test of history had shown that the responsible officials of the Building Trades unions had on all occasions responded wholeheartedly to the Panel's request to keep essential production going whenever such request had been made. If this record of responsible union leadership continues, Mr. Davis said, "the practical effect of the Panel's operation will be as effective under this ad hoc arrangement as under the original intent of the plan."[4]

CASE NO.: 30

AEC INSTALLATION: Hanford Works Projects, Richland, Washington

PARTIES: Guy F. Atkinson Company and J. A. Jones Construction Company; Sheet Metal Workers International Association, Local #99

On October 19 the Atkinson-Jones Construction Company notified the Panel that a dispute existed between it and local #99 of the Sheet Metal Workers International Association,

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4. Ibid., p. 17.

A. F. of L. at Hanford which resulted in strike action that morning. The company asked the Panel to assume jurisdiction. The Panel sent a telegram to the parties involved on October 16 stating that it had taken jurisdiction and that a meeting would be arranged as soon as the men returned to work. On the same day the Panel received a telegram from Robert Bryon, international president of the union, which said that he had instructed the local business agent to return the men to work. Accordingly a meeting was scheduled for November 2 in Washington.

One of the issues in this arose again last August when the Hanford Master Agreement covering most of the trades was reopened. Since many of the other crafts on the project had already referred this dispute to the Wage Stabilization Board, the Panel's suggestion to the parties that they submit this question to the Wage Stabilization Board along with the other craft involved was accepted.

In the dispute over the wage rate the company offered a rate of $2.475 which is equivalent to the current Spokane rate. The union asked for a considerably higher rate and supported this demand on two premises: L) that a more applicable comparison is with the higher rates paid in the Seattle area, and, 2) that the Spokane agreement did not fully exhaust the permissable amount applicable under the wage stab-

ilization regulations. As discussions continued disputes renarrowed down to the following considerations: 1) what is the appropriate area to be considered for the establishment of Hanford rates, and, 2) what is the maximum amount allowable without a special ruling under Wage Stabilization Board regulations. In this respect to the latter consideration, the union's position was that the July 1, 1950 base date rate was $2.35 and that 10% over this rate would automatically allow a new rate of $2.585. The company did not dispute this computation but pointed out that the $2.35 rate was not put into effect until August 1, 1950.

After hearing these arguments the Panel analyzed the problem as one which involved wage stabilization policy. In this connection the Panel stated that it would take no action which would result in a piercing of the ceiling established by the Wage Stabilization Board. At the same time the Panel said that it was aware of its responsibility as the custodian of a no-strike arrangement. In such a situation the Panel would utilize its mediation offices to seek a voluntary agreement, failing that, it would try to obtain voluntary consent of the parties to submit their wage dispute to the Wage Stabilization Board; and failing that the Panel would, if necessary, issue recommendations which would fall with the regulations of the Wage Stabilization Board approval.

After further negotiation the Panel proposed the following six points for resolving the disputes:

1) The issue of wages shall be submitted to the Wage Stabilization Board for final determination;

2) Vacation time shall be computed at the rate of four hours per month;

3) The company agrees to put into effect a welfare fund equivalent to 7½ ¢ per hour similar to that negotiated in Spokane, such plan to be submitted to the Wage Stabilization Board for approval;

4) The question of isolation pay shall be submitted to the Wage Stabilization Board and consolidated with the cases now pending before the Board from the Hanford Project;

5) The effective date of the agreement shall be August 1, 1951;

6) The question of travel and subsistence pay outside the barrier shall be settled by further negotiations at the local level.

The substance of these points were later agreed to be the parties and incorporated into a memoranda of agreement.

CASE NO.: 31

AEC INSTALLATION: Hanford Works Projects, Richland, Washington.

PARTIES: Guy F. Atkinson Company and J. A. Jones Construction Company
International Associated Machinists, Lodge #1743

On October 18, the Panel was asked by the Atkinson-Jones Construction Company to assume jurisdiction of a dispute between it and Loddge #1743 of the International Association of Machinists, A. F. of L. The Panel accepted jurisdiction and set up a meeting in Washington for November 2.

The matter of isolation pay, by agreement, was submitted to the Construction Industry Stabilization Commission of the Wage Stabilization Board. The principal issues remaining in this dispute was the wage rate for precision machinists to other crafts on other construction jobs. Since the union did not have available sufficient data to support this claim, the following procedure was suggested by the Panel and accepted by the parties:

> "MEMORANDUM of the Atomic Energy Labor Relations Panel of Parties International Association of Machinists - Atkinson-Jones Dispute
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> The parties agreed before the Panel on Friday, November 2, to gather facts on the following criteria:
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> 1. The historical relationship of machinists to other construction workers;
> 2. Customary crafts relationships of machinists in construction today;
> 3. "Within craft," "out-of-shop" differentials;
> 4. Evaluation of "in-shop" fringes on machinists;
>
> The foregoing criterial will be gathered in the area defined as the Northwest."

The Panel said that it would retain jurisdiction of the dispute while these facts were being gathered. Panel member Godfrey P. Schmidt was appointed to aid the parties in preparing a report based on the facts. If an agreement is not then reached in direct negotiations, the Panel will issue recommendations. As of Decemberl, this case was still open.

CASE NO.: 32

AEC INSTALLATION: Knolls Atomic Laboratory, Schenectady, New York

PARTIES: General Electric Company

International Brotherhood of Teamsters, A.F. of L., Local #294

On October 19 the Panel received a letter from the vice president of Local 294 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL in Schenectady requesting its intervention in a dispute between that union and the General Electric Company at the Knolls Atomic Laboratory. The Panel replied, advising the local that a request for interventions should be channeled through the international office. On October 27 a letter from local counsel advised the Panel that Local #294 "is entirely autonomous in these negotiations."[5] The Panel then sought from the Atomic Energy Commission advice as to whether strike of the Teamsters at this facility would "threaten to interfere with an essential part of the atomic program."[6]. The Atomic Energy Commission replied that "a strike of Teamsters would not immediately affect these essential programs although a continued failure to transport the (essential) materials would have serious consequences. Hence we would not now regard this dispute as constituting a threat to the essential work at Knolls."[7]

Accordingly, on October 31, the Panel advised the parties that in accordance with the procedures outlined in Section 5c of the report of the President's Commission on Labor

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5. Ibid., p. 21.

6. Ibid., p. 21.

7. Ibid., p. 21

Relations in the Atomic Energy Installations the Panel hereby announces that it does not intend to take jurisdiction of this dispute at this time, being informed by the Atomic Energy Commission that this dispute does not now threaten an essential part of the atomic energy program.

The Panel understands that a strike was called by the Teamsters at Knolls during the second week of November and, on December 1, was still in progress.

CASE NO.: 33

AEC INSTALLATIONS: Sandia Base, Albuquerque, New Mexico

PARTIES: Sandia Corporation
Atomic Projects and Production Workers, Metal Trades Council, AF of L
Office Employees International Union, AFL, Local #251

This case pertains to the joint negotiations of the Atomic Projects and Production Workers, Metal Trades Council, A. F. of L. with the Sandia Corporation. On October 26 the Panel received a request from the two unions involved to intervene in a dispute between them and the corporation over the terms of a contract renewal.

After being informed by the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service that it could make no further progress, the Panel assumed jurisdiction and announced meetings to be held in Albuquerque commencing November 17. The parties were asked to prepare briefs in advance of these meetings.

There were 20 open issues when the Panel entered the

case. The most complex issue, and the one which was the major block to an agreement, arose over the operation of the corporation's job evaluation plan.

The Panel spent most of its time in Albuquerque on November 17 and 18 in listening to the arguments presented by both sides. In the discussion, it was evident that some of the unions' grievances arose from insufficient or erroneous facts. To rectify this, the corporation was asked to prepare a list of the items concerning the operation of the job evaluation and job grading plan for presentation both to the Panel and to the unions. It was also evident that the proposals submitted by the unions were not in a form which could be clearly understood by the corporation. The unions were therefore asked to re-work its proposals for a presentation both to the Panel and to the corporation.

Since it would take some time for both sides to comply with these requests, the hearings were adjourned until December 1 in Washington, D. C. This case, as of December 1, 1951 was still open.

Employment on the various projects necessitated the hiring of many non-union men. As a result protests arose from private organizations relative to the employment practices. In particular those of Du Pont were made the target of attack on the development of the Savannah River Project.[8] In a docu-

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8. M. Mead Smith, Labor and the Savannah River AEC Project, (U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Monthly Labor Review, June 1952, Vol. 74, No. 6, p. 629-639.

mentation by M. Mead Smith in June 1952, the Ku Klux Klan, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, and the National Urban League criticized the hiring practices relative to their special interests. Figures showed that Negroes composed 20% of Du Pont's construction force in November 1951. Of this nember (3369) all but 9% were common laborers.[9] In a meeting with AEC officials the NAACP and National Urban League, charged Du Pont with passing the buck in the hiring of skilled Negroes. The AEC found the real reasons could not be brought into open due to the limited nonmanual staff and a certain amount of tacit "self-segregation,"[10] on the part of Negroes.

The Atomic Energy Commission's Policy is an American Democratic one, tolerating no segregation or discrimination, because of race, creed, or color, on its jobs. Even the adherence to local customs of eating separately, using separate toilets and basins are prohibited by AEC.[11]

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9. M. Mead Smith, Labor and the Savannah River AEC Project, (U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Monthly Labor Review, June 1952, Vol. 74, No. 6, p. 635.

10. Ibid., p. 635.

11. Ibid., p. 635.

Chapter V

GENERALIZATIONS

The effect of atomic energy has been tremendous on our national economy. Its discovery brought about a vast, new, and encompassing program in our industrial economy. This has not been without serious inroads on some of our most precious raw materials. Further, from the first contract let to Columbia University to the expenditures of the two billion dollars for the successful completion of the bombs dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima, there were many thousands of workers, both skilled and unskilled employed. Their efforts were combined for the realization of one of the greatest human progresses in span, since homo sapiens' inhabitance of the earth. The shortening of this progress was due to the genii of scientists like Albert Einstein, from whose hand came the first letter to President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, which told of the practicability of atomic energy development for military purposes. It is true that the initial efforts were geared to the exigencies of war. Nevertheless, significant development for private industrial uses have been noted, and it is expected that such will contribute to the consumer satisfaction of our Nation. Especially, has such progress and development

been noted in the fields of medicine, agriculture, and engineering functions.

From this development of "great energy" has been the climate for the relationship of Government, industry, and workers. Its evolutionary trends present one of the most awe-inspiring studies for division of labor or plain utilization of human effort, brains and brawn, in the history of civilization. Entering on the stage of its development in 1946 was the Atomic Energy Commission. Supported by the Atomic Energy Act and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy it has maintained the tempo with which it received the Nation's greatest responsibility. Efficiently, it has guided research, commerce, production, and labor relations in the industry.

Once the AEC had received its full authority from the Manhattan Engineer District, it sought to give attention to the problems of labor relations in no distorted manner. Recognition was given the character of the atomic energy industry in light of its mission. As a result three major areas were given constant evaluation. They were:

1. Strikes (work stoppages)
2. Security
3. Loyalty

Work stoppages, when commanding attention, included also the lock-out aspect of defensive weapons on the part of management. During the period in which MED was in charge,

there was a no-strike pledge and a no-lock-out pledge on the part of labor and contractors. This was carried on by AEC. Therefore, neither the machinery of the Wagner Act nor that of the Taft-Hartley was permitted to be fully used by the AEC. Even after the anti-Communist oath was taken, care was exercised for security reasons in the hiring of personnel. It is evident that the loyalty and security of personnel combined to make the program a success and the no-work stoppage pledges contributed to the patriotic aspect. From 1948, when the ban was completely lifted on the use of the Taft-Hartley's facilities, almost two years elapsed before there was any serious work stoppage.

Strikes did not occur until after the war when there was a relaxation of the no-strike pledge. Then in the period covered from July to September 1951, Gordon Dean, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, made known the fact that more than 500,000 man hours had been lost. Later a declaration was to be made that one strike involving the Teamsters, as weighed by the AEC upon the Labor Panel's request, would not have any appreciable affect on the particular facility at which it occurred.

The Labor Relations Panel appointed by President Truman in 1948, contributed much to the molding of policies now in evidence. Its present membership, composed of six members, has affected six areas for disolution of disputes. These have not been without regard for the Taft-Hartley, which be-

came more operative in 1948. Yet a perusal of the cases handled by it will cause nothing but the deepest respect for the untiring work and unrelenting efforts to bring and maintain harmonious relations between Government, management, and labor. The experience of the Panel placed solution under the heads of:

1. Direct negotiations
2. Panel recommendations
3. Aid of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service of the NLRB
4. Panel mediation
5. A combination of Panel mediation followed by Panel recommendations
6. Atomic Energy Commission's advice

Mediation and arbitration centered on areas of:

1. Union security
2. Continuity of operation
3. Retroactivity
4. Shift differential
5. Wages
6. Isolation pay
7. Job classification
8. Job evaluation
9. Protective clothing compensation
10. Inter-union disputes
11. Contract language
12. General conditions of labor, safety, and security.

This study might well place the AEC among the foremost quasi-judicial bodies in the history of American Civilization. It has exemplified the traditional spirit of the American pioneers. But not without utilization of almost every available agency to cope with a new and unique problem in industrial development, relations, and labor relations. Surveys made for adequate housing, available labor supply, schools, and general living conditions, have had no previous rivals in economic development. The cooperation of the state and local Governments has been instrumental, also, in the successful accomplishment of this aspect of relations.

Policy formation developed to such an extent that the Panel added to its recommendations on wages, those of the Wage Stabilization Board. The influence of the Wage Stabilization Board and its recommendations was part of its belief that every stone should be turned over to uncover equitable ideas of settlement. Further, every means of persuasion should be used to get the parties together and agree on wages, when in dispute, within the limits of the Wage Stabilization Board's policy.

As of its last report in December 1951, the Panel had handled 33 cases. In keeping with the policy and pledge of the AEC, it had sought to preserve the rights of American labor, intervening in disputes or negotiations only so far as the National interest warranted such. From its no-strike

and no-lock out pledges, it had had a chance to view the honest, loyal, and patriotic efforts of American workers for their Nation's defense economy. This was from an advantage that was not usually realized in private industry as far as mediation and arbitration are concerned. Because it had this advantage, of necessity suggests, that far greater problems loomed. Regardless of their scope, however, it is quite clear that the greatest of these was National Defense.

Conclusions

It is appropriate to conclude that the atomic energy program has had an enormous effect upon the American industrial economy. This effect might be pointed up in the following ways:

1. The military urgency of the program was responsible for its unusual character. Especially, in the classification of data and contractual relations.

2. The strain on the economy in the mining industry and the use of certain materials and minerals in the U. S.

3. The need to import many minerals for our economy

4. The fact that we are in a wartime or advanced defense economy, due to the vast expenditures for atomic energy and defense, according to ex-President Hoover.

5. Atomic armies, navies, and air forces seem to be cheaper than the conventional ones.

6. Research will be carried on to develop the economy in the areas of,

   a. soil production

   b. possible industrial uses on a larger scale,

   c. the welfare of workers and the American pub-

lic in general by the advocation of protective measures for the Nation's health

7. Civilian Defense is a most important consideration and atomic energy development has placed new emphasis on it or caused such.

8. The Labor Relations Panel has been successful in achieving an unusual harmony in labor relations.

9. In a careful analysis of the problem involved in atomic energy production a pledge has been made to preserve the individual character and rights of American labor; interference being only where the security of a worker, all workers, or the American population are concerned.

10. The continued expansion will make greater demands upon and create new opportunities for laborers of all races, creeds, and color.

Recommendations

Due to the availability of information and experience that resulted only from such information, the full weight of this huge and portentous development can be viewed only in light of such. The power of atomic energy as disclosed in the documents under the bibliography, is enough to dwarf the animate. Yet, animate human beings must exert the proper intelligence and control to be worthy of atomic energy. It developed out of a need, and new ones are arising, both for its control and proper use in the economy. Therefore, as a result of the study it is felt that there are needs for:

1. Increased consideration on the question surrounding the permanency of in-migrant labor problems

2. Consideration of the conversion from an advanced defense economy to the normal one

3. Constant attention to the threat of Communist infested unions

4. Attention to problems arising out of materials and tool shortages and critical labor areas to the

tempo and acceleration of the defense program

5. Increased dissemination of 'public-cleared' information about the entire atomic energy program

6. Economy in operation as much as possible, and

7. Continued harmony in the relations of Government, management, and labor.

Atomic energy development in the American economy has made significant dents in the area of labor relations. Viewing the AEC and the President's Labor Relation Panel tend to signal an entirely new policy for industrial relations in Government and private industry. Those who oppose the Taft-Hartley vigorously may find an area from which to mold their thinking as to its real merits. Regardless of the pros and cons, the AEC and the Labor Relations Panel have so far used the machinery of Federal labor legislation for the highest possible policy-making for harmonious labor relations.

Future developments and fuller use of them will be the result of their continued prudence and foresight for the National interest of the United States in a world of distrust and undying embers of tension, among nations.

APPENDIX

A. U. S. Atomic Energy Commission and Managers of Operations and Area Offices

Atomic Energy Commission ----------Gordon Dean, Chairman
T. Kieth Glennan
Thomas E. Murray
H. D. Symth
(vacancy)

Managers of Operations and Area Officers:

Chicago (Ill.) Operation Office -- A. Tammaro

Ames (Iowa) Area Office ---------- W. ". Lord

Berkely (Calif.) Area Office ------ H. A Fidler

Pittsburgh (Pa) Area Office ------ Lawton D. Geiger

Colorado (Grand Junction Raw Material Office) ---------- Frank H. Macperson

Hanford (Washington) ---------- L. E. Johnston

New York (N. Y.) Operations Office Wilbur D. Kelley

Brookhaven (Long Island) Area Office ---------- E. L. Van Horn

Cleveland (Ohio) Area Office ----- Edward Sargent

Fernald (Cincinnati, Ohio) Area Office ---------- James F. Chandler

St. Louis (Mo.) Area Office ------ C. L. Karl

Oak Ridge (Tenn.) Operstions Office ---------- S. R. Sapirie

Dayton (Miamisbury, Ohio) -------- Fred R. Belcher

Kentucky (Paducah) Area Office --- Kenneth A. Dunbar

Santa Fe (Albuquerque, N. Mex.)
Field Office ---------- Carrol L. Tyler

Los Alamos (N. Mex.) Field Office -- Elmo R. Morgan

Nevada Test Site Field Office ------ Ralph P. Johnson

Sandia (N. Mex.) Field Office------- Daniel Worth, Jr.

Savannah River (Ga.) Operations
Office ---------- Curtis A. Nelson

Dana (Terre Haute, Ind.) Area
Office ---------- Bourke Samples

Schenectady (N. Y.) Operations
Office ---------- Jon D. Anderson

B. MILITARY LIAISON COMMITTEE

Under sec. 2 (c) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, as amended, "there shall be a Military Liaison Committee consisting of a Chairman, who shall be the head thereof, and of a representative or representatives of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, detailed or assigned threto, without additional compensation, in such number as the Secretary of Defense may determine. Representatives from each of the three Departments shall be designated by the respective Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The Committee Chairman shall be appointed by the President, by and with the consent of the Semate, and shall receive compensation at a rate prescribed by law for the Chairman of the Munitons Board. The Commission shall advise and consult with the Committee on all atomic energy matters which the Committee deems to relate to military applications, including the development, manufacture, use and storage of bombs, and allocation of fissionable mater-

ial for military research, and the control of information relating to the manufacture or utilization of atomic weapons. The Commission shall keep the Committee fully informed of all such matters before it and the Committee shall keep the Commission fully informed of all atomic energy activities of the Department of Definse. The Committee shall have authority to make written recommendations to the Commission on matters relationg to the military applications from time to time as it may deem appropriate. If the Committee at any time concludes that any action, proposed action, or failure to act of the Commission on such matters is adverse to the responsibilities of the Department of Defense, derived from the Constitution, laws, and treaties, the Committee may refer such action, proposed action, or failure to act to the Secretary of Defense. If the Secretary concurs, he may refer the matter to the President, whose decision shall be final.

Hon. Robert LeBaron, Chairman

Brig. Gen. Herbert B. Loper, United States Army

Brig. Gen. Stanley R. Mickelson, United States Army

Rear Adm. Charles F. Coe, United States Navy

Rear Adm. Frederic S. Withington, United States Navy

Maj. Gen. Roger M. Ramey, United States Air Force

Maj. Gen. Roscoe C. Wilson, United States Air Force

Col. Harry McK. Roper, executive secretary, United States Army.

C. PERMANENT PANEL APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT - ATOMIC ENERGY LABOR RELATIONS PANEL

The members of this panel were appointed by the President in 1949 and in 1950 to take jurisdiction and mediate labor management disputes which threaten to interfere with essential operations of the Atomic Energy Commission. The Panel operates under procedures designed to safeguard continuity of operations while not inhibiting free collective bargaining between AEC contractors and unions. To date it has acted upon 33 labor management disputes in AEC installations, and has reported semi-annually to the President of its activities.

William H. Davis, Chairman; of Davis, Hoxie & Faithfull, New York, N.Y.; Chairman, Patent Survey Committee, U. S. Department of Commerce.

Frank P. Douglas; of Douglas & Douglas, Oklahoma City, Okla.

John T. Dunlop, Professor of economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., public member, Wage Stabilization Board.

Aaron Horvitz, Lawyer, and arbitor, New York, and New Jersey.

Godfrey P. Schmidt, Lawyer, New York, N. Y.

Edwin E. Witte, Chairman, Department of economics, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin.

D. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

This committee of leading authorities from government, industry, and education was named in September 1948 to provide the Atomic Energy Commission with a continuous review

of its personnel management practices and to evaluate the best personnel methods of government and industry in determining overall AEC policies. The Committee usually meets once a month.

Arthur S. Flemming, Chairman; President, Ohio Wesleyan University, Delaware, Ohio; ass't to the director, Office of Defense Mobilization.

Lawrence A Appley, President, American Management Association, New York.

Alvin E. Dodd, Honorary President, AMA, New York, N. Y.

L. Clayton Hill, Professor of industrial relations, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan

Wallace Sayre, Professor of public administration, school of civic and business administration, City College, N.Y.

Thomas G. Spates, Professor of industrial administration, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.; for vice-president, General Foods Corporation

E. GENERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE

This committee was established by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (sec. 2 (b). The nine civilian members are appointed by the President to advise the Commission on scientific and technical matters relating to materials, production, and research development. Under the Atomic Energy Act, the Committee shall meet at least four times in every calendar year; the Committee held its first meeting in January 1947, and to date has averaged six meetings a year.

Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, Chairman; director, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, N. J.

Dr. Oliver E. Buckley, Chairman; Bell Telephone Laboratories, New York

Dr. James B. Conant, President; Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.

Dr. Lee A. DuBridge, President; California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, Calif.

Dr. W. F. Libby, Professor of chemistry, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois.

Dr. I. I. Rabi, Professor of Physics., Columbia University, New York, N. Y.

Dr. Eger V. Murphee, President; Standard Oil Development Company, New York, N. Y.

Dr. Cyril S. Smith, Director; Institute for the study of Metals, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois.

Walter G. Whitman, Head, Department of Chemical engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass.

Dr. Richard W. Dodson, Secretary, Chairman, Department of Chemistry, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Upton, Long Island, New York.

F. PATENT COMPENSATION BOARD

Casper W. Ooms, Chairman; of Dawson & Ooms, Chicago, Ill.

Issac Harter, Chairman, Babcock & Wilcox Tube Co., Beaver Falls, Pennsylvania

John V. L. Hogan, Consulting Engineer, Hogan Laboratories Inc., New York, New York.

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